Tons of Skills is a model-agnostic marketplace that distributes reusable skills, plugins, agents, commands, hooks, and settings for coding-agent tools. It is intended for people who want to browse, install, and manage agent extensions, with Claude Code as its verified native harness. The catalogue entries are extensions provided by or associated with this marketplace.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace --skill cachegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplaceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/cache)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/cache"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/cache/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/cache"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace/cache.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Memory Poisoning · line 5 Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.Fix: Protect agent memory and state from modification by untrusted content. Use read-only memory for critical instructions and validate all state changes.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 117 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 150 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00078 | $0.02471 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.01236 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00494 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00247 |
Grade A, and why
cache scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 13d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 207 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cache
CRUD interface for .hyperflow/memory/. Full protocol: memory-system.md.
Storage
All operations target .hyperflow/memory/ at the project root. Never modify source code files — if asked to "remember X about file Y", add a memory entry only, never edit Y.
Subcommands
| Subcommand | Description |
|---|---|
show [tag] |
Print index or filter entries by tag |
search <query> |
Full-text search across all memory files |
add <category> <title> |
Append a new entry (prompts for details) |
edit <entry-id> |
Find entry by date+title slug and update in place |
prune |
Remove stale, superseded, and orphaned entries |
archive |
Move entries older than 30 days to cold storage |
clear |
Wipe all memory (with confirmation, recoverable) |
stats |
Counts, tier breakdown, tag frequency, oldest/newest |
migrate |
Import entries from legacy ~/.claude/hyperflow-memory.md |
off |
Disable memory writes for this session |
compact |
Summarise aged memory entries into stubs + monthly archive sidecars |
Subcommand Details
show [tag]
No arg → print index.md. With tag → filter all files for matching entries.
Output table: Date | Title | Tags | File | Tier
search <query>
grep/ripgrep across learnings.md, decisions.md, pitfalls.md, patterns.md, conventions.md.
Return file:line + snippet, ranked by relevance.
add <category> <title>
Categories: learning decision pitfall pattern convention
Prompt via AskUserQuestion for: what, why it matters, tags (controlled vocab).
Append to the matching file using:
### [YYYY-MM-DD] <title> `[tag1, tag2]`
**What:** ...
**Why it matters:** ...
**Evidence:** ...
That is the whole write. index.md is derived — scripts/memory-index.py rebuilds it at the next session start. Never append index rows by hand; to refresh it now, run python3 scripts/memory-index.py .hyperflow.
edit <entry-id>
Locate by date+title slug. Show current value, prompt for new value, update in place.
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 13d ago First seen · 207 lines · 78 tokens per session scan A 1e1147ffc5ca
cache is a skill published in the GitHub repository jeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace (2,717 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 78 tokens to every session and 2,471 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
kb
Use when querying and maintaining the knowledge base for project context, decisions, and architecture documentation on session start.
kb-memory
Use when knowledge base and memory system for AI agents. Covers company KB, persistent memory, session recall, and brain architecture for context preservation.
mk:memory
JSON-canonical session memory. Use when capturing session learnings, extracting patterns, or tracking costs — persists to .meowkit/memory JSON stores; matching Markdown files are generated views. Activates during Phase 0 (Orient) to load context and Phase 6 (Reflect) to persist it. NOT for weekly-cadence engineering…
c-memory
Persistent memory across Claude Code sessions — remember facts, preferences, and context.
notes
Skill "notes" from Pinvou/pinvou-agent, covering ima notes, operations, write rules, examples and response handling.
exploiting-format-string-vulnerabilities
Methodology for exploiting format string bugs where attacker-controlled data reaches the format argument of printf-family functions, enabling stack/memory disclosure (info leaks for ASLR/PIE/canary defeat) and arbitrary write primitives (%n) to hijack control flow via GOT/.finiarray overwrites.