Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add julianobarbosa/claude-code-skills --skill container-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/julianobarbosa/claude-code-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/julianobarbosa/claude-code-skills/container-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/julianobarbosa/claude-code-skills/container-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/julianobarbosa/claude-code-skills/container-security.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00108 | $0.02641 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00054 | $0.01321 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00022 | $0.00528 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00264 |
Grade C, and why
container-security scanned grade C with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
chmod 700 /home/<user>/.ssh && \ Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
RUN curl .../releases/latest/download/tool | bash Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
- **Clean apt caches**: always end with `&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*` Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
RUN curl .../releases/latest/download/tool | bash How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 241 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container Image Security
Complete workflow for securing container images: scan, analyze, harden, verify.
Workflow Overview
Import base image to ACR → Build → Scan with Trivy → Analyze CVEs → Harden Dockerfile → Rebuild → Re-scan → Verify
1. Import Base Images to ACR
Avoid Docker Hub rate limits by importing base images into your private ACR. Azure's infrastructure pulls on your behalf — no Docker Hub auth needed.
# Import a public image into ACR
az acr import --name <registry> \
--source docker.io/<image>:<tag> \
--image <local-path>/<image>:<tag>
# Example: import code-server
az acr import --name example-app \
--source docker.io/codercom/code-server:4.107.1 \
--image addons/code-server:4.107.1
# Verify
az acr repository show --name <registry> --repository <local-path>/<image>
Then update the Dockerfile FROM to reference the ACR copy:
# Before (hits Docker Hub rate limits in ACR cloud builds)
FROM codercom/code-server:latest
# After (pulls from local ACR — no rate limit)
FROM example-app.azurecr.io/addons/code-server:4.107.1
Important: ACR cloud builds (az acr build) are unauthenticated against Docker Hub. Any FROM referencing Docker Hub will eventually hit rate limits. Always import first.
2. Build with ACR
az acr build --registry <registry> --image <repo>:<tag> -f Dockerfile .
ACR builder limitations — these Docker features are NOT supported:
COPY <<'EOF'heredoc syntax (BuildKit-only) — useRUN printforRUN catinstead- Multi-platform builds require
--platformflag - BuildKit-specific
RUN --mountdirectives
3. Scan with Trivy
Option A: Trivy via ACR Task (recommended for CI)
First, import Trivy itself into ACR (once):
az acr import --name <registry> \
--source docker.io/aquasec/trivy:latest \
--image tools/trivy:latest
Then scan:
# Table format for human review
az acr run --registry <registry> \
--cmd "<registry>.azurecr.io/tools/trivy:latest image \
--severity HIGH,CRITICAL \
<registry>.azurecr.io/<image>:<tag>" /dev/null
# JSON format for programmatic analysis
az acr run --registry <registry> \
--cmd "<registry>.azurecr.io/tools/trivy:latest image \
--severity HIGH,CRITICAL --format json \
<registry>.azurecr.io/<image>:<tag>" /dev/null
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 241 lines · 108 tokens per session scan C 2185f0006801
container-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository julianobarbosa/claude-code-skills (10 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 108 tokens to every session and 2,641 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 4 findings (asks for root, downloads and executes remote code, recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
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compute-env-setup
Set up a reproducible Feynman compute environment for research jobs. Use when a task needs Python/R packages, GPU libraries, containers, Modal, SSH, caches, or managed model runtime setup.
securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
This skill covers hardening managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity, RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. It addresses cloud-specific security features including IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for…
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Harden Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control by implementing least-privilege policies, auditing role bindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, and integrating external identity providers.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.