Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add JustVugg/tools-factory --skill sentrygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/JustVugg/tools-factoryWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/justvugg/tools-factory/sentry)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/justvugg/tools-factory/sentry"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/justvugg/tools-factory/sentry/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/justvugg/tools-factory/sentry"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/justvugg/tools-factory/sentry.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 58 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 65 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 74 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 81 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 98 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 115 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 120 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 128 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 145 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 217 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 256 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.04890 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.01956 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00978 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00489 |
Grade A, and why
sentry scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 272 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
sentry
Generated by Gutenberg. Use this skill to call the sentry API through the local sentry CLI.
When to use
- The user asks for data exposed by sentry (Alerts, Crons, Dashboards, Discover, Environments, Events).
- An agent task needs structured JSON from https://{region}.sentry.io.
- You need to perform a write/destructive operation on sentry — always preview first, run with
--yesonly on explicit user confirmation.
How to invoke
The skill assumes the generated CLI is on PATH (or invoke via scripts/use-go.sh run ./cmd/sentry from the project directory).
sentry operations
sentry call List Your Organizations --json
sentry sync --json
sentry search "<keyword>" --json
Preview a write operation (default behavior, no side effects):
sentry call Update an Organization --data '{"example":true}' --json
Execute it (only after explicit user confirmation):
sentry call Update an Organization --data '{"example":true}' --yes --json
Authentication
Set SENTRY_API_KEY in the environment, or pass --api-key <key>.
Operations index
List Your Organizations(GET /api/0/organizations/) — read — Return a list of organizations available to the authenticated session in a region. This is particularly useful for requests with a user bound context. For API key-based requests this will only return the organization that belongs to the key.Retrieve an Organization(GET /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/) — read — Return details on an individual organization, including various details such as membership access and teams.Update an Organization(PUT /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/) — write — Update various attributes and configurable settings for the given organization.Get Integration Provider Information(GET /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/config/integrations/) — read — Get integration provider information about all available integrations for an organization.List an Organization's Custom Dashboards(GET /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/dashboards/) — read — Retrieve a list of custom dashboards that are associated with the given organization.Create a New Dashboard for an Organization(POST /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/dashboards/) — write — Create a new dashboard for the given OrganizationRetrieve an Organization's Custom Dashboard(GET /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/dashboards/{dashboard_id}/) — read — Return details about an organization's custom dashboard.Edit an Organization's Custom Dashboard(PUT /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/dashboards/{dashboard_id}/) — write — Edit an organization's custom dashboard as well as any bulk edits on widgets that may have been made. (For example, widgets that have been rearranged, updated queries and fields, specific display types, and so on.)Delete an Organization's Custom Dashboard(DELETE /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/dashboards/{dashboard_id}/) — destructive — Delete an organization's custom dashboard.Fetch an Organization's Monitors(GET /api/0/organizations/{organization_id_or_slug}/detectors/) — read — ⚠️ This endpoint is currently in beta and may be subject to change. It is supported by New Monitors and Alerts and may not be viewable in the UI today.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 272 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A f0cd9252183b
sentry is a skill published in the GitHub repository JustVugg/tools-factory (59 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 4,890 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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