Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add KalarisLabs/Skill-Doctor --skill receiving-code-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/KalarisLabs/Skill-DoctorWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/kalarislabs/skill-doctor/receiving-code-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kalarislabs/skill-doctor/receiving-code-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kalarislabs/skill-doctor/receiving-code-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kalarislabs/skill-doctor/receiving-code-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kalarislabs/skill-doctor/receiving-code-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00038 | $0.00629 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00315 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00126 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00063 |
Grade A, and why
receiving-code-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 97 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Code Review Reception
Overview
Code review requires technical evaluation, not emotional performance.
Core principle: Verify before implementing. Ask before assuming. Technical correctness over social comfort.
The Response Pattern
WHEN receiving code review feedback:
1. READ: Complete feedback without reacting
2. UNDERSTAND: Restate requirement in own words (or ask)
3. VERIFY: Check against codebase reality
4. EVALUATE: Technically sound for THIS codebase?
5. RESPOND: Technical acknowledgment or reasoned pushback
6. IMPLEMENT: One item at a time, test each
Forbidden Responses
NEVER:
- "You're absolutely right!" (explicit instruction-file violation)
- "Great point!" / "Excellent feedback!" (performative)
- "Let me implement that now" (before verification)
INSTEAD:
- Restate the technical requirement
- Ask clarifying questions
- Push back with technical reasoning if wrong
- Just start working (actions > words)
Handling Unclear Feedback
IF any item is unclear:
STOP - do not implement anything yet
ASK for clarification on unclear items
WHY: Items may be related. Partial understanding = wrong implementation.
Example:
your human partner: "Fix 1-6"
You understand 1,2,3,6. Unclear on 4,5.
⌠WRONG: Implement 1,2,3,6 now, ask about 4,5 later
[RIGHT]: "I understand items 1,2,3,6. Need clarification on 4 and 5 before proceeding."
Source-Specific Handling
From your human partner
- Trusted - implement after understanding
- Still ask if scope unclear
- No performative agreement
- Skip to action or technical acknowledgment
From External Reviewers
BEFORE implementing:
1. Check: Technically correct for THIS codebase?
2. Check: Breaks existing functionality?
3. Check: Reason for current implementation?
4. Check: Works on all platforms/versions?
5. Check: Does reviewer understand full context?
IF suggestion seems wrong:
Push back with technical reasoning
IF can't easily verify:
Say so: "I can't verify this without [X]. Should I [investigate/ask/proceed]?"
IF conflicts with your human partner's prior decisions:
Stop and discuss with your human partner first
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 97 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A 30e70e317ad3
receiving-code-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository KalarisLabs/Skill-Doctor (11 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 629 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-11.
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