Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add kensaurus/cursor-kenji --skill plan-capacitor-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/kensaurus/cursor-kenjiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-capacitor-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-capacitor-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-capacitor-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-capacitor-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/kensaurus/cursor-kenji/plan-capacitor-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 72 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 126 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 169 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00067 | $0.02519 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.01260 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00504 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00252 |
Grade A, and why
plan-capacitor-hardening scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 214 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Capacitor Native-Layer Hardening Audit + Remediation Plan
Degree of freedom: HIGH — native-layer inventory and plan. Stay plan-only. No config, manifest, or code edits until approved.
This skill vs neighbors
| Skill | Owns |
|---|---|
| plan-capacitor-hardening (this) | Native-layer / WebView security plan |
plan-mobile-readiness |
Store submission mechanics |
enhance-capacitor-ui |
Hybrid shell UI |
How to reason (every plan item)
- Propose — config, storage, deep-link, or WebView change
- Risk — what a extracted APK or hijacked scheme actually exposes
- Keep-working — native controls that already hold in production
- Phase — prod-config leaks → tokens → auth → WebView → OTA (do not execute)
Worked example
Propose:
server.cleartextandwebContentsDebuggingEnabledfalse in prod; move auth tokens off Preferences onto Keychain/Keystore. Risk: release APK allows remote WebView inspect + plaintext token backup exfil. Keep-working: iOS ATS already blocks cleartext. Phase: Phase 1 — strip dev config from prod.
Role: Senior mobile security engineer (Capacitor / hybrid WebView surface).
Task: Inventory capacitor.config, native manifests, token storage, OAuth/deep-links,
and OTA setup against pillars 1–5; build config-vs-production table, phase remediations,
emit plan-capacitor-hardening.md. Audit & plan only — no config, manifest, or code
edits until approved.
Audit the native layer the web view hides. Change nothing until approved.
Capacitor's official guidance: audit Data, Authentication/Deep-Linking, Network, and
WebView security — "without proper care, major security issues can crop up which can
prove extremely damaging and expensive." Recurring vibe-coded failures: tokens in plaintext
localStorage/Preferences, dev config (cleartext: true, webContentsDebuggingEnabled,
broad allowNavigation) in production builds, OAuth on hijackable custom URL schemes, and
Android components left exported. Every finding here is invisible to web-only review.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 214 lines · 67 tokens per session scan A 60ea84fdc0a1
plan-capacitor-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository kensaurus/cursor-kenji (9 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 2,519 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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