Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add KhaledSaeed18/dotclaude --skill owasp-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/KhaledSaeed18/dotclaudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/khaledsaeed18/dotclaude/owasp-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/khaledsaeed18/dotclaude/owasp-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/khaledsaeed18/dotclaude/owasp-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/khaledsaeed18/dotclaude/owasp-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/khaledsaeed18/dotclaude/owasp-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00082 | $0.01462 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00033 | $0.00585 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00292 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00146 |
Grade A, and why
owasp-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 28d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 72 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Check code against the vulnerability classes most likely to produce real incidents. This is a line-level review of code being written or changed, not a full codebase sweep. Read the changed code and its immediate context (callers, middleware, schema) before forming any finding. Report only what can be demonstrated from the code - not what might theoretically apply.
Injection (OWASP A03)
Any place where user-controlled data flows into an interpreter is a potential injection point. Check every such flow:
- SQL and NoSQL: are all parameters bound via a prepared statement or parameterized query? Any string concatenation or template literal that includes user input in a query is a finding.
- Command execution:
exec,spawn,system,popen- is any argument derived from user input? Shell metacharacters must never reach these functions from user data. - Path traversal: file system operations on paths that include user input must resolve and validate the final path against an allowed base directory.
path.join(base, userInput)is not sufficient without checking the result starts with the allowed base. - Template injection: user-controlled strings passed to template engines (Handlebars, Pug, Jinja2) must be treated as data, not templates.
- Deserialization:
eval,Function(), and deserializers that execute code (pickle,node-serialize, YAML with!!python/object) must never operate on untrusted input.
Broken Access Control (OWASP A01)
Authorization bugs are the most common critical finding in production systems:
- Ownership check: for every operation that reads or writes a resource, is there an explicit check that the authenticated principal owns or has permission to access that specific resource? Checking that the user is authenticated is not the same as checking that they own this record.
- Horizontal escalation: can a user substitute another user's ID in a request parameter and access their data? The server must validate ownership, not trust the ID from the client.
- Vertical escalation: are admin-only endpoints protected by a role check in addition to authentication? Is the role check done server-side?
- Forced browsing: are there endpoints that are "hidden" rather than protected? Any endpoint without explicit auth middleware is a finding.
- Client-side-only enforcement: any access control that can be bypassed by modifying the request (hidden form fields, JavaScript checks, front-end routing guards) must have a server-side counterpart.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 28d ago Changed · -20 tokens per session 7c9ea18d7d89
- 1mo ago First seen · 72 lines · 102 tokens per session scan A 2ba02803f9ae
owasp-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository KhaledSaeed18/dotclaude (5 stars, last pushed 6d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 82 tokens to every session and 1,462 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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