Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh --skill analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidencegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zhWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh/analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00116 | $0.02168 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00058 | $0.01084 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00434 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00217 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 217 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
分析攻击活动溯源归因证据
概述
攻击活动溯源归因(Attribution)分析涉及系统性地评估证据,以确定哪个威胁行为者(Threat Actor)或组织对某次网络行动负责。本技能涵盖使用 Diamond Model 和 ACH(竞争假设分析)收集并加权溯源指标、分析基础设施重叠、TTP 一致性、恶意软件代码相似性、操作时序模式和语言痕迹,以构建置信度加权的归因评估报告。
前置条件
- Python 3.9+,安装
attackcti、stix2、networkx库 - 访问威胁情报平台(MISP、OpenCTI)
- 了解 Diamond Model 入侵分析框架
- 熟悉 MITRE ATT&CK 威胁组织画像
- 掌握恶意软件分析和基础设施追踪技术
核心概念
溯源证据类别
- 基础设施重叠:共享 C2 服务器、域名、IP 范围、托管服务商
- TTP 一致性:跨攻击活动中匹配的 ATT&CK 技术和子技术
- 恶意软件代码相似性:共享代码库、编译器、PDB 路径、加密例程
- 操作模式:时序(工作时间、时区)、目标模式、操作节奏
- 语言痕迹:特定语言的嵌入字符串、变量名、错误消息
- 受害者学:目标行业、地理位置和组织画像一致性
置信度级别
- 高置信度:多个独立证据类别聚焦于同一行为者
- 中置信度:若干证据类别匹配,但存在一定模糊性
- 低置信度:证据有限,可能存在伪旗或共享工具
竞争假设分析(ACH)
一种结构化分析方法,针对多个竞争假设评估证据。每条证据针对每个假设被评分为一致、不一致或中性。不一致证据最少的假设为优先假设。
实践步骤
步骤 1:收集溯源证据
from stix2 import MemoryStore, Filter
from collections import defaultdict
class AttributionAnalyzer:
def __init__(self):
self.evidence = []
self.hypotheses = {}
def add_evidence(self, category, description, value, confidence):
self.evidence.append({
"category": category,
"description": description,
"value": value,
"confidence": confidence,
"timestamp": None,
})
def add_hypothesis(self, actor_name, actor_id=""):
self.hypotheses[actor_name] = {
"actor_id": actor_id,
"consistent_evidence": [],
"inconsistent_evidence": [],
"neutral_evidence": [],
"score": 0,
}
def evaluate_evidence(self, evidence_idx, actor_name, assessment):
"""评估证据与假设的关系:一致/不一致/中性。"""
if assessment == "consistent":
self.hypotheses[actor_name]["consistent_evidence"].append(evidence_idx)
self.hypotheses[actor_name]["score"] += self.evidence[evidence_idx]["confidence"]
elif assessment == "inconsistent":
self.hypotheses[actor_name]["inconsistent_evidence"].append(evidence_idx)
self.hypotheses[actor_name]["score"] -= self.evidence[evidence_idx]["confidence"] * 2
else:
self.hypotheses[actor_name]["neutral_evidence"].append(evidence_idx)
def rank_hypotheses(self):
"""按溯源分数对假设进行排序。"""
ranked = sorted(
self.hypotheses.items(),
key=lambda x: x[1]["score"],
reverse=True,
)
return [
{
"actor": name,
"score": data["score"],
"consistent": len(data["consistent_evidence"]),
"inconsistent": len(data["inconsistent_evidence"]),
"confidence": self._score_to_confidence(data["score"]),
}
for name, data in ranked
]
def _score_to_confidence(self, score):
if score >= 80:
return "HIGH"
elif score >= 40:
return "MODERATE"
else:
return "LOW"
What ships with it
7 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 217 lines · 116 tokens per session scan A 4d5f9a3bc8c8
analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence is a skill published in the GitHub repository killvxk/cybersecurity-skills-zh (45 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 116 tokens to every session and 2,168 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence
Systematically evaluate cyber-campaign evidence to attribute an operation to a threat actor, using the Diamond Model and Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) to weigh infrastructure overlaps, TTP consistency, malware code similarity, and timing/language artifacts into confidence-weighted attribution assessments. Use…
analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence
Use when campaign attribution analysis involves systematically evaluating evidence to determine which threat actor or group is responsible for a cyber operation. This skill covers collecting and weighting attr.
analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence
Campaign attribution analysis involves systematically evaluating evidence to determine which threat actor or group is responsible for a cyber operation. This skill covers collecting and weighting attr.
analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence
Campaign attribution analysis involves systematically evaluating evidence to determine which threat actor or group is responsible for a cyber operation. This skill covers collecting and weighting attr.
analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence
Campaign attribution analysis involves systematically evaluating evidence to determine which threat actor or group is responsible for a cyber operation. This skill covers collecting and weighting attr.
analyzing-campaign-attribution-evidence
Campaign attribution analysis involves systematically evaluating evidence to determine which threat actor or group is responsible for a cyber operation. This skill covers collecting and weighting attr.