reddapi

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

• high Prompt Injection · line 75
  This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
• high YARA Match · line 75
  YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
  Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
• high Supply Chain · line 169
  Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
  Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
• medium Excessive Agency · line 52
  Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
  Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 93
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 169
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• medium Excessive Agency · line 57
  Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.
  Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.