Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/loopdive/js2npx agentmods add skills/loopdive/js2/dev-self-mergeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/loopdive/js2/dev-self-merge)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/loopdive/js2/dev-self-merge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/loopdive/js2/dev-self-merge/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/loopdive/js2/dev-self-merge"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/loopdive/js2/dev-self-merge.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 379 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 79 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 79 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 81 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 84 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 85 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 86 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 264 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 264 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 266 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 269 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.06186 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00022 | $0.02474 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.01237 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00619 |
Grade A, and why
dev-self-merge scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 433 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/dev-self-merge <N>
Devs DO NOT enqueue. On a passing self-check, mark the task completed and stand down — the server-side
auto-enqueue.ymlworkflow enqueues (#2786). This skill's outcomes are MERGE (regression self-check passes → mark the task completed and stand down; you do NOT touch the merge queue) or ESCALATE (to tech lead). The PR is enqueued by the server-side workflow, not by you.Why devs no longer enqueue (#2786). The old model had the dev one-shot enqueue when green, with a background CI watcher to do it after stand-down. But that watcher is a child of the dev process — it died with the agent, so a green PR whose dev had stood down stranded un-enqueued (#2225, #2247). The fix moves enqueue to the one actor that is long-lived and outside agent lifecycle: the GitHub Actions workflow. Its
workflow_run-on-completion trigger fires right after the required-check workflows finish, and its grace window is now 0 (#2786), so it enqueues every just-green PR within ~one workflow-startup — no dependence on any agent surviving. The required checks arecheap gate (main-ancestor + lint),merge shard reports, andquality.The merge queue then re-validates on the merged state.
merge_groupre-runs the required checks (the regression-gate #1943 — the hard block), andauto-park(#2547) labels any PR that fails the merge_group re-runhold. The workflow's single trailing-add enqueue never loops, so it cannot cause the re-enqueue "cancellation churn" (memoryproject_merge_queue_requeue_cancels_run) that poll-loop re-adds caused on 2026-06-20.Backstops, not the mechanism: the workflow's ~30-min cron, and the tech lead's per-loop open-PR sweep (CLAUDE.md "Tech lead discipline") — both catch the rare stray the responsive
workflow_runrun misses (e.g. a PR the queue dropped on main-advance). Neither is the primary path.SECURITY — the workflow's author-trust gate is now load-bearing. With no dev enqueue, the workflow is the single enqueuer; it only enqueues PRs whose
authorAssociationis OWNER/MEMBER/COLLABORATOR. External contributor PRs are never auto-enqueued — they require a deliberate maintainer enqueue plus a greencla-check.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 433 lines · 54 tokens per session scan A 615dc4911f29
dev-self-merge is a skill published in the GitHub repository loopdive/js2 (66 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 6,186 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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