Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add loulanyue/awesome-claude-notes --skill perl-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/loulanyue/awesome-claude-notesWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/loulanyue/awesome-claude-notes/perl-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/loulanyue/awesome-claude-notes/perl-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/loulanyue/awesome-claude-notes/perl-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/loulanyue/awesome-claude-notes/perl-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/loulanyue/awesome-claude-notes/perl-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 179 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 240 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 179 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 179 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 240 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high YARA Match · line 240 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 4 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 507 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00043 | $0.03855 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.01928 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00771 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00385 |
Grade B, and why
perl-security scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
open my $fh, $path; # If $path = "|rm -rf /", runs command! Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Copies of this mod
6 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- perl-security — 91% identical, 12 lines differ
- perl-security — 91% identical, 11 lines differ
- perl-security — 88% identical, 9 lines differ
- perl-security — 88% identical, 11 lines differ
- perl-security — 83% identical, 14 lines differ
- perl-security — 83% identical, 14 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 513 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Perl Security Patterns
Comprehensive security guidelines for Perl applications covering input validation, injection prevention, and secure coding practices.
When to Activate
- Handling user input in Perl applications
- Building Perl web applications (CGI, Mojolicious, Dancer2, Catalyst)
- Reviewing Perl code for security vulnerabilities
- Performing file operations with user-supplied paths
- Executing system commands from Perl
- Writing DBI database queries
How It Works
Start with taint-aware input boundaries, then move outward: validate and untaint inputs, keep filesystem and process execution constrained, and use parameterized DBI queries everywhere. The examples below show the safe defaults this skill expects you to apply before shipping Perl code that touches user input, the shell, or the network.
Taint Mode
Perl's taint mode (-T) tracks data from external sources and prevents it from being used in unsafe operations without explicit validation.
Enabling Taint Mode
#!/usr/bin/perl -T
use v5.36;
# Tainted: anything from outside the program
my $input = $ARGV[0]; # Tainted
my $env_path = $ENV{PATH}; # Tainted
my $form = <STDIN>; # Tainted
my $query = $ENV{QUERY_STRING}; # Tainted
# Sanitize PATH early (required in taint mode)
$ENV{PATH} = '/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin';
delete @ENV{qw(IFS CDPATH ENV BASH_ENV)};
Untainting Pattern
use v5.36;
# Good: Validate and untaint with a specific regex
sub untaint_username($input) {
if ($input =~ /^([a-zA-Z0-9_]{3,30})$/) {
return $1; # $1 is untainted
}
die "Invalid username: must be 3-30 alphanumeric characters\n";
}
# Good: Validate and untaint a file path
sub untaint_filename($input) {
if ($input =~ m{^([a-zA-Z0-9._-]+)$}) {
return $1;
}
die "Invalid filename: contains unsafe characters\n";
}
# Bad: Overly permissive untainting (defeats the purpose)
sub bad_untaint($input) {
$input =~ /^(.*)$/s;
return $1; # Accepts ANYTHING — pointless
}
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 513 lines · 43 tokens per session scan B 9a9cacfcdf07
perl-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository loulanyue/awesome-claude-notes (270 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 43 tokens to every session and 3,855 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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