Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add madarco/agentbox --skill agentbox-setupgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/madarco/agentboxWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/madarco/agentbox/agentbox-setup)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/madarco/agentbox/agentbox-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/madarco/agentbox/agentbox-setup/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/madarco/agentbox/agentbox-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/madarco/agentbox/agentbox-setup.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 179 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 302 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 314 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 17 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 55 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 80 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 179 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00038 | $0.06325 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.02530 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.01265 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00632 |
Grade B, and why
agentbox-setup scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y postgresql-client How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 349 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/agentbox-setup
Box layout (what you're configuring against)
Your user i vscode and you can use sudo to run commands as root.
/workspace is where the user code lives, a per-box git worktree on a fresh agentbox/<box-name> branch (or a tar-piped copy of the host workspace for non-git projects).
Run agentbox checkpoint --set-default (similar to docker commit) to save any changes make to the system and workspace so that new boxes will start from a warm state. Everything is wiped on agentbox destroy.
Some special folders:
- Host main repo's
.git/— If the box bind-mounted RW at its identical absolute host path. In-box commits land on the host's branch refs (visible togit logon the host immediately); the box itself carries no SSH/git creds, sogit pushgoes through the host relay (agentbox-ctl git push). The host's working tree is never written to — only refs/objects under.git/. GitHub PR ops (agentbox-ctl git pr create|view|list|comment|review|merge|close|reopen|checkout) flow the same way through hostgh; write ops require host confirmation (deny → exit 10),mergeandcheckouthave additional opt-in guards. ~/.claude— and similar home folders for coding agents are seeded from the host's~/.claudeon each create so auth, skills, and plugins persist without leaking the host's home dir.agentbox.yaml— read byagentbox-ctlfrom/workspace. Tasks and services declared here are what the supervisor will run.
Exposed ports and services:
- portless - every port with
expose:setting in agentbox.yaml, will be exposed not only as a local port but also as a special domain namehttps://<name>.localhost(so on https) usingportlesscli and proxy. This will be also mapped to the host where alsoportlessproxy is running so users can access the same service on the same looking url. - vnc - the webVNC server exposed on 6080 will be proxies to the host on a random port.
- vscode - the vscode server is proxied to the host on a random port.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +31 lines 03ccc8ef6650
- 1mo ago First seen · 318 lines · 38 tokens per session scan B 77dee19c82bb
agentbox-setup is a skill published in the GitHub repository madarco/agentbox (538 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 6,325 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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