Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill 10-cloud-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-SkillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/10-cloud-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/10-cloud-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/10-cloud-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/10-cloud-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/10-cloud-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 16 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 202 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 203 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 247 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 251 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 261 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 342 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 203 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 203 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 247 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 261 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- low Tool Misuse · line 210 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 232 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 210 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 232 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 210 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- low Tool Misuse · line 232 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00027 | $0.04464 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.01786 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00893 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00446 |
Grade B, and why
10-cloud-security scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
RUN chmod 777 /app # ← World-writable is dangerous Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* # Clean up after install Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
RUN apt-get install -y curl # ← Install what you need during build The source is not reproduced here
A licence we could not identify
The repository carries a LICENSE file, but it is custom or dual enough that GitHub cannot name it and neither can this catalogue. Unknown terms are not permission, so the body is not copied here. Read the licence at the source and decide for yourself.
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago Changed a3d30bd56bd9
- 10d ago Changed · +21 lines · -3 tokens per session 5e2e03607bc9
- 1mo ago Changed 907b8a5af732
- 1mo ago First seen · 474 lines · 30 tokens per session scan B d1f0807d0be7
10-cloud-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill (512 stars, last pushed 6d ago), with no licence file. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 4,464 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (asks for root, recursive force delete, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
analytical-method-validation
Plans, executes, and documents validation, verification, and transfer of analytical procedures under the governing framework - ICH Q2(R2) and Q14, USP / / , ICH M10 bioanalytical, CLSI EP, or ISO/IEC 17025. Use for HPLC, LC-MS/MS, GC, CE, ICP-MS, dissolution, qNMR, qPCR, NIR, and ligand binding or cell-based assays…
iso-standards-readiness
Prepares and structurally reviews readiness evidence for ISO management-system and laboratory-competence standards - ISO 13485 medical device QMS, ISO 14971 device risk management, ISO/IEC 17025 testing and calibration laboratories, and ISO 15189 medical laboratories. Use when organizing declared scope, controlled…
modal
Modal is a serverless cloud platform for running Python on demand, including on-demand GPUs. Use when deploying or serving AI/ML models, running GPU-accelerated workloads (training, fine-tuning, inference), serving web endpoints, scheduling batch jobs, or scaling Python code to cloud containers with the Modal SDK.
nextflow
Builds, runs, and debugs Nextflow DSL2 pipelines and nf-core workflows. Use for Nextflow, nf-core, .nf files, nextflow.config, processes/channels/operators, samplesheets, nf-test, modules/subworkflows, container and executor configuration, HPC/SLURM or cloud deployment, and failed or resumed pipeline runs.
treatment-plans
Formats and structurally validates local treatment-plan documentation after clinical decisions have already been supplied and verified by authorized licensed professionals. Use for source traceability, clinician-authored intervention records, goals and checkpoints, shared-decision records, reconciliation handoffs, and…
latchbio-integration
Builds, registers, debugs, and operates bioinformatics workflows on Latch using the Python SDK, CLI, Latch Data and Registry, Nextflow, Snakemake, programmatic execution, and Latch MCP. Use when authoring or deploying Latch workflows, configuring resources or interfaces, moving data, integrating Registry, or launching…