Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill 15-blue-team-defensegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-SkillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/15-blue-team-defense)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/15-blue-team-defense"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/15-blue-team-defense/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/15-blue-team-defense"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/masriyan/claude-code-cybersecurity-skill/15-blue-team-defense.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 73 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 195 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 217 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 196 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 218 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 185 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 187 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 223 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 258 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 248 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 351 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00030 | $0.06818 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.03409 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.01364 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00682 |
Grade B, and why
Blue Team Defense & Hardening scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/sudo -F perm=x -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -k sudo_use Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 757 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Blue Team Defense & Hardening
Purpose
Enable Claude to assist defenders with comprehensive security hardening, detection rule engineering, security baseline establishment, patch management, and security architecture review. Claude directly analyzes provided configurations, scripts, and system state — then produces specific hardening commands, detection rules, and improvement plans.
Activation Triggers
This skill activates when the user asks about:
- Hardening Linux (Ubuntu, RHEL, CentOS, Debian) servers
- Hardening Windows Server or Windows workstations (CIS Benchmarks)
- Creating detection rules (Sigma, Splunk, KQL, YARA, Snort/Suricata)
- Security baseline definition and monitoring
- Patch management strategy and prioritization
- Security architecture review (defense-in-depth, zero trust)
- Implementing Sysmon, auditd, or Windows audit policy
- Hardening SSH, nginx, Apache, or database configurations
- Network security controls and microsegmentation
- Endpoint protection (EDR, HIPS) configuration guidance
- Security posture improvement after a red team or pentest
Prerequisites
pip install pyyaml jinja2 requests
Tools used in this skill:
Sysmon— Windows endpoint telemetry (SwiftOnSecurity config recommended)auditd— Linux audit daemonLynis— Linux security auditing toolOpenSCAP / oscap— CIS/STIG compliance scanningfail2ban— SSH and service brute-force protectionCIS-CAT— CIS Benchmark compliance tool
Core Capabilities
1. Linux System Hardening
When the user asks to harden a Linux server:
Claude produces specific commands ready to run.
SSH Hardening
# /etc/ssh/sshd_config — Secure SSH configuration
cat >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config << 'EOF'
# Security hardening
Protocol 2
PermitRootLogin no
PasswordAuthentication no
PermitEmptyPasswords no
MaxAuthTries 3
LoginGraceTime 30
ClientAliveInterval 300
ClientAliveCountMax 2
AllowUsers [specific_users] # Explicit user allowlist
PubkeyAuthentication yes
AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys
X11Forwarding no
AllowAgentForwarding no
AllowTcpForwarding no
PrintMotd no
Banner /etc/ssh/banner
Subsystem sftp /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server -l INFO
EOF
# Restart SSH (check config first)
sshd -t && systemctl restart sshd
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed 0f28f95782f3
- 12d ago First seen · 757 lines · 30 tokens per session scan B 5da2b88cb34f
Blue Team Defense & Hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill (409 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 6,818 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (asks for root, reaches for credential files). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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