setup

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

• high Agent Snooping · line 28
  Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.
  Fix: Remove all code or instructions that access agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). If configuration values are needed, pass them explicitly as parameters or environment variabl
• high Tool Misuse · line 58
  Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
  Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
• high Tool Misuse · line 68
  Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
  Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
• high Tool Misuse · line 72
  Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
  Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 67
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• medium Privilege Escalation · line 68
  Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
  Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
• medium Privilege Escalation · line 77
  Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
  Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
• medium Privilege Escalation · line 72
  Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
  Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
• medium Privilege Escalation · line 164
  Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
  Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 120
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• low Supply Chain · line 58
  Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
  Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.