Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack --skill hunting-persistence-on-linuxgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-packWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-persistence-on-linux)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-persistence-on-linux"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-persistence-on-linux/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-persistence-on-linux"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack/hunting-persistence-on-linux.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00067 | $0.00689 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00345 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00138 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00069 |
Grade C, and why
hunting-persistence-on-linux scanned grade C with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
(`curl|wget ... | sh`, `base64 -d | bash`, reverse-shell one-liners, `nc -e`), suspicious paths Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Encoded or obfuscated payloadmediumSupply chain
base64 or hex that is decoded and executed hides what actually runs from anyone reading the file.
(`curl|wget ... | sh`, `base64 -d | bash`, reverse-shell one-liners, `nc -e`), suspicious paths Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
(`curl|wget ... | sh`, `base64 -d | bash`, reverse-shell one-liners, `nc -e`), suspicious paths What it actually says
Hunting Persistence on Linux
When to Use
- You have collected Linux persistence-relevant files (cron entries, systemd units, shell rc
files,
authorized_keys, autostart) and want to flag suspicious entries. - You are triaging a suspected compromised Linux host's persistence surface.
Do not use this on a live root shell as a substitute for proper IR collection — feed it collected copies. It reads files statically and executes nothing.
Prerequisites
- Collected persistence artifacts (cron files, unit files, rc files,
authorized_keys).
Safety & Handling
- Read files statically; treat their contents as untrusted.
Workflow
Step 1: Scan persistence files
python scripts/analyst.py scan /path/to/collected
Recursively scans known persistence locations and flags entries containing download/exec patterns
(curl|wget ... | sh, base64 -d | bash, reverse-shell one-liners, nc -e), suspicious paths
(/tmp, /dev/shm), and unexpected authorized_keys additions.
Step 2: Categorize by mechanism
Group findings by mechanism: cron, systemd, rc/profile, SSH keys, autostart.
Step 3: Confirm
Compare against a known-good baseline of expected services/keys; investigate deviations.
Step 4: Document
Record each persistence entry, its mechanism, and the suspicious indicator.
Validation
- Findings are grouped by persistence mechanism.
- Reverse-shell/download-exec one-liners are flagged with the matched pattern.
authorized_keysadditions are surfaced for review.
Pitfalls
- Legitimate admin cron/systemd entries — baseline before alerting.
- Persistence in less-common spots (udev, PAM, LD_PRELOAD) not covered by basic scans.
- Encoded/obfuscated payloads hiding the true command.
References
- See
references/api-reference.mdfor the scanner. - ATT&CK T1543.002 and T1053.003 (linked in frontmatter).
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 89 lines · 67 tokens per session scan C 2e7227c5c939
hunting-persistence-on-linux is a skill published in the GitHub repository meltedinhex/analyst-ai-pack (22 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 67 tokens to every session and 689 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 3 findings (downloads and executes remote code, encoded or obfuscated payload, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-cobalt-strike-beacon-configuration
Extract and analyze Cobalt Strike beacon configuration from PE files and memory dumps to identify C2 infrastructure, malleable profiles, and operator tradecraft.
analyzing-golang-malware-with-ghidra
Reverse engineer Go-compiled malware in Ghidra by parsing Go buildinfo and pclntab structures, recovering stripped/obfuscated function names (e.g. via GoResolver), and extracting embedded module/dependency strings and types from Go binaries. Use when analyzing a Go-language malware sample, deobfuscating a…
analyzing-malware-persistence-with-autoruns
Use Sysinternals Autoruns to systematically enumerate and analyze malware persistence mechanisms across Windows registry run keys, scheduled tasks, services, drivers, and startup locations. Use when hunting for persistence during Windows incident response, triaging a compromised endpoint, or validating that malware…
analyzing-malicious-pdf-with-peepdf
Perform static analysis of malicious PDF documents using peepdf, pdfid, and pdf-parser to extract embedded JavaScript, shellcode, and suspicious objects. Use when triaging a suspicious PDF attachment from a phishing email, analyzing a PDF-based exploit document, or building detection signatures for weaponized PDF…
analyzing-persistence-mechanisms-in-linux
Scan Linux systems for persistence mechanisms including crontab/systemd entries, LDPRELOAD injection, shell profile modifications (.bashrc, .profile), and SSH authorizedkeys backdoors, then correlate findings with auditd logs into an installation timeline. Use during incident response or threat hunting to detect or…
analyzing-linux-elf-malware
Analyze malicious Linux ELF binaries — botnets, cryptominers, ransomware, and rootkits targeting Linux servers, containers, and cloud infrastructure — through static analysis, dynamic tracing, and reverse engineering of x8664 and ARM samples. Use when investigating Linux malware, triaging a suspicious ELF binary…