acontext-installer

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

• high Supply Chain · line 32
  Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
  Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
• high Supply Chain · line 37
  Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
  Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
• high Supply Chain · line 42
  Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.
  Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
• high Tool Misuse · line 32
  Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
  Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
• high Tool Misuse · line 37
  Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
  Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
• high Privilege Escalation · line 134
  Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
  Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
• high Privilege Escalation · line 143
  Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
  Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
• medium Rogue Agent · line 16
  Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
  Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
• medium Agent Snooping · line 17
  Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
  Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
• medium Agent Snooping · line 18
  Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
  Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
• medium Rogue Agent · line 52
  Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
  Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
• medium Agent Snooping · line 67
  Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
  Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 157
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 183
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• medium Agent Snooping · line 239
  Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
  Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.