Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add mifunedev/openharness --skill health-checkgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mifunedev/openharnessWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mifunedev/openharness/health-check)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mifunedev/openharness/health-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mifunedev/openharness/health-check/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mifunedev/openharness/health-check"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mifunedev/openharness/health-check.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 43 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 18 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 262 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00153 | $0.05028 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00061 | $0.02011 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00031 | $0.01006 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00503 |
Grade A, and why
health-check scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 267 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Health Check
Report-first resource triage. Answers two questions: can we start <target> right now, and what is the safest way to recoup headroom if not. Destructive reclaim is never automatic — only the regenerable build cache is pruned without asking.
This skill spans two scopes, and step 0 decides which one you are in. Docker inventory and every reclaim lever live on the machine running the daemon; memory, swap, disk and CPU can be read on either side but mean different things depending on where you read them. The sandbox has had no host Docker socket since #756 removed it as a host-root escape path, so a sandboxed invocation reports container-scope metrics and hands the Docker half to the orchestrator. Never present container figures as host figures — that is the failure mode this structure exists to prevent, and it is worse than reporting nothing, because a green container disk row reads like permission to start a multi-GB image build.
target is free text naming what you intend to start (a compose path, make dev, a service name). It sizes the verdict — a full docker compose build and a make dev against already-running services have very different footprints, so always pin down which before judging "sufficient."
Performance rules
Default to a fast path: one scope classification, one host snapshot, one Docker summary, one running-container list, and one exited-container list. Do not run verbose or per-container probes until the summary shows a likely binding constraint or the user asks for reclaim candidates.
- Gate expensive commands:
docker system df -v,docker stats,docker exec <container> ps ...,du, and nested-Docker inspection are second-pass diagnostics, not baseline checks. - Run expensive diagnostics once and reuse the captured output. Never call
docker system df -vinside a loop over volumes/images/containers. - Prefer scoped reads over broad scans: explicit cache paths (
~/.npm, project.pnpm-store) are acceptable;du -sh /home/*or filesystem-widefindis not. - Keep reruns delta-oriented: if a prior health-check in the same thread already found the shape of the problem, recheck only the changed metrics unless the target changed.
- Never retry a Docker call that failed for want of a daemon. Step 0 settles reachability once. Nine copies of the same connection error is not diagnosis.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 267 lines · 153 tokens per session scan A 2b6101010d6f
health-check is a skill published in the GitHub repository mifunedev/openharness (37 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 153 tokens to every session and 5,028 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
health-check compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| health-checkmifunedev/openharness | Skill | 37 | 2mo ago | Apache-2.0 | A | 153 | Claude Code |
| tao-setup-nvidia-gpu-hostNVIDIA-TAO/tao-skill-bank | Skill | 99 | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | B | 177 | Claude Code |
| data-visualizationlangchain-ai/deepagents | Skill | 31k | yesterday | MIT | A | 40 | Claude Code, Codex |
| cuml-machine-learninglangchain-ai/deepagents | Skill | 31k | yesterday | MIT | A | 43 | Claude Code, Codex |
| rememberlangchain-ai/deepagents | Skill | 31k | yesterday | MIT | A | 71 | Claude Code, Codex |
| schema-explorationlangchain-ai/deepagents | Skill | 31k | yesterday | MIT | A | 57 | Claude Code, Codex |
| deepagents-thread-inspectorlangchain-ai/deepagents | Skill | 31k | yesterday | MIT | A | 93 | Claude Code, Codex |