Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty --skill triage-validationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bountyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/triage-validation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/triage-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/triage-validation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/triage-validation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty/triage-validation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00087 | $0.02528 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00044 | $0.01264 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00506 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00253 |
Grade A, and why
triage-validation scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 253 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
TRIAGE & VALIDATION
One wrong answer = STOP. Kill it. Move on.
"N/A hurts your validity ratio. Informative is neutral. Only submit what passes all 7 questions."
THE 7-QUESTION GATE
Ask IN ORDER. One wrong answer = STOP immediately.
Q1: Can an attacker use this RIGHT NOW, step by step?
Complete this template:
1. Setup: I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body — copy-paste ready]
3. Result: I can [read / modify / delete] [exact data shown in response]
4. Impact: The real-world consequence is [account takeover / PII read / money stolen]
5. Cost: Time: [X minutes], Capital: [$0 / $X subscription required]
If you CANNOT write step 2 as a real HTTP request → KILL IT.
Q2: Is the impact on the program's accepted impact list?
Go to the program page. Find "Vulnerability Types" or "Out of Scope."
Common tiers:
- Critical: Any-user ATO without interaction, RCE, SQLi with data exfil, admin auth bypass
- High: Mass PII exfil, privilege escalation, internal SSRF with data, stored XSS all users
- Medium: IDOR on specific user non-critical data, XSS on sensitive page requiring click
- Low: Non-sensitive info disclosure, clickjacking with PoC
If your bug maps to a listed exclusion → KILL IT.
Q3: Is the root cause in an in-scope asset?
Confirm:
- Vulnerable domain is on the in-scope list (not
*.internal.target.com) - It's a production asset (not staging/dev unless explicitly in scope)
- It's not a third-party service the company just uses (not Stripe, Salesforce, Google Auth)
If out-of-scope → KILL IT.
Q4: Does it require privileged access that an attacker can't realistically get?
- "Admin can do X" = centralization risk = KILL IT (on 99% of programs)
- "Non-admin can do X that only admin should do" = valid
- "Requires physical access / MFA device" = usually invalid
- "Requires compromised victim account to work" = questionable, low severity at best
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 253 lines · 87 tokens per session scan A 5ed3f6e75891
triage-validation is a skill published in the GitHub repository Mikacr1138/claude-bug-bounty (2 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 87 tokens to every session and 2,528 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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