Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill aws-iam-enumgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/aws-iam-enum)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/aws-iam-enum"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/aws-iam-enum/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/aws-iam-enum"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/aws-iam-enum.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00025 | $0.00657 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00329 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00131 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00066 |
Grade A, and why
aws-iam-enum scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
86% identical to aws-iam-enum — 8 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 66 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AWS IAM Enumeration + Privesc
1. Identity check
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws iam get-account-summary
2. Attached policies
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/attached.json
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/inline.json
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name ME --output json > /tmp/groups.json
For each attached policy ARN:
aws iam get-policy --policy-arn ARN --query 'Policy.DefaultVersionId'
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn ARN --version-id VID > /tmp/policy.json
Then:
iam_policy_audit(open("/tmp/policy.json").read())
3. Check each privesc primitive
Rhino Security's canonical 21 paths — any Allow on these is a chain step:
- iam:CreateAccessKey (other user)
- iam:CreateLoginProfile
- iam:UpdateLoginProfile
- iam:AttachUserPolicy / iam:AttachGroupPolicy / iam:AttachRolePolicy
- iam:PutUserPolicy / iam:PutGroupPolicy / iam:PutRolePolicy
- iam:CreatePolicyVersion (if SetAsDefault=true)
- iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion
- iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction
- iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances
- iam:PassRole + ecs:RunTask / UpdateService
- glue:CreateDevEndpoint / UpdateDevEndpoint
- cloudformation:CreateStack with iam:PassRole
- datapipeline:CreatePipeline
- lambda:UpdateFunctionCode (existing function with priv role)
- iam:AddUserToGroup
- iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy
- iam:CreateRole + sts:AssumeRole
- codebuild:CreateProject with iam:PassRole
- sagemaker:CreateTrainingJob with iam:PassRole
- aws-marketplace:Subscribe (rare, but noted)
- sts:AssumeRole (direct)
4. Graph promotion
kg_add_node(kind="vulnerability", label="IAM:CreateAccessKey → account takeover", props={"severity":"critical","source":"aws-iam"})
kg_add_node(kind="crown_jewel", label="AWS Account 1234")
kg_add_edge(src=<vuln>, dst=<crown_jewel>, kind="grants", weight=0.3)
5. Common chains
- Dev user has
iam:PassRole+lambda:CreateFunction+ a Lambda role with admin → create malicious Lambda → assume admin iam:UpdateLoginProfile+sts:GetFederationToken→ temporary console access as another user
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 66 lines · 25 tokens per session scan A 935425581a45
aws-iam-enum is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 25 tokens to every session and 657 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 86% identical to aws-iam-enum, differing in 8 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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