Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill certipy-esc-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/certipy-esc-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/certipy-esc-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/certipy-esc-chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/certipy-esc-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/certipy-esc-chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00093 | $0.01661 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00046 | $0.00830 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00332 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00166 |
Grade B, and why
certipy-esc-chain scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca.target.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \ This is a copy
97% identical to ad-certipy-esc-chain — 2 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 131 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ADCS Abuse via Certipy
certipy (Oliver Lyak / ly4k) is the single best tool for ADCS attack. Full domain compromise from a low-priv user in 4 commands, given a vulnerable template.
1. Find vulnerable templates
certipy find -u '[email protected]' -p 'pass' -dc-ip <dc-ip> \
-enabled -vulnerable -text -stdout
# Output: shows every ESC1-ESC15 finding with the affected template
# Look for: "ESC1", "ESC2", "ESC3" sections in the report
If you can't auth, use -username '' -password '' (anonymous LDAP — sometimes works) or use the local LDAP from a compromised machine.
2. The ESC catalog — quick reference
| ESC | Misconfiguration | Exploitation primitive |
|---|---|---|
| ESC1 | Template allows SAN (Subject Alt Name) + Client Auth EKU + low-priv enrollee | Request cert as any user (-upn [email protected]) |
| ESC2 | Template allows Any Purpose EKU | Same as ESC1, any role |
| ESC3 | Template has Certificate Request Agent EKU + low-priv enrollee | Use the cert to request "on behalf of" another user |
| ESC4 | Vulnerable ACL on template (WriteOwner/WriteDacl/GenericAll) | Modify template to make it ESC1, then exploit |
| ESC5 | Vulnerable ACL on PKI objects (CA, OID containers) | Same — modify, then exploit |
| ESC6 | EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag on CA |
Request ANY template with -upn target |
| ESC7 | Low-priv has Manage CA / Manage Certificates | Approve own requests, issue certs to anyone |
| ESC8 | HTTP-based enrollment endpoint exists | NTLM relay to /certsrv/certfnsh.asp (see ad-coercer) |
| ESC9 | msPKI-Enrollment-Flag lacks STRONG_KEY_PROTECTION_REQUIRED and template has UPN mapping |
Spoof UPN, get cert |
| ESC10 | Weak certificate mapping (UPN-only, no SID extension) | Same as ESC9 but for kerberos PKINIT |
| ESC11 | RPC binding without packet integrity | Relay over RPC instead of HTTP |
| ESC13 | Template grants OID group membership (ADCS-managed groups) | Get cert → become member of high-priv group |
| ESC14 | Specific weak ACE patterns on cert templates | Edit template, ESC1-chain |
| ESC15 | EKUwu — EKU manipulation on V1 templates |
Add Client Auth EKU to a template that lacked it |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 131 lines · 93 tokens per session scan B f84100fe3751
certipy-esc-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 93 tokens to every session and 1,661 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). It is 97% identical to ad-certipy-esc-chain, differing in 2 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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