Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill certipy-esc-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/certipy-esc-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/certipy-esc-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/certipy-esc-chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/certipy-esc-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/certipy-esc-chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 68 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 85 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00094 | $0.01662 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00047 | $0.00831 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00332 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00166 |
Grade B, and why
ad-certipy-esc-chain scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
sudo impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca.target.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \ Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- certipy-esc-chain — 97% identical, 2 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 131 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
ADCS Abuse via Certipy
certipy (Oliver Lyak / ly4k) is the single best tool for ADCS attack. Full domain compromise from a low-priv user in 4 commands, given a vulnerable template.
1. Find vulnerable templates
certipy find -u '[email protected]' -p 'pass' -dc-ip <dc-ip> \
-enabled -vulnerable -text -stdout
# Output: shows every ESC1-ESC15 finding with the affected template
# Look for: "ESC1", "ESC2", "ESC3" sections in the report
If you can't auth, use -username '' -password '' (anonymous LDAP — sometimes works) or use the local LDAP from a compromised machine.
2. The ESC catalog — quick reference
| ESC | Misconfiguration | Exploitation primitive |
|---|---|---|
| ESC1 | Template allows SAN (Subject Alt Name) + Client Auth EKU + low-priv enrollee | Request cert as any user (-upn [email protected]) |
| ESC2 | Template allows Any Purpose EKU | Same as ESC1, any role |
| ESC3 | Template has Certificate Request Agent EKU + low-priv enrollee | Use the cert to request "on behalf of" another user |
| ESC4 | Vulnerable ACL on template (WriteOwner/WriteDacl/GenericAll) | Modify template to make it ESC1, then exploit |
| ESC5 | Vulnerable ACL on PKI objects (CA, OID containers) | Same — modify, then exploit |
| ESC6 | EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 flag on CA |
Request ANY template with -upn target |
| ESC7 | Low-priv has Manage CA / Manage Certificates | Approve own requests, issue certs to anyone |
| ESC8 | HTTP-based enrollment endpoint exists | NTLM relay to /certsrv/certfnsh.asp (see ad-coercer) |
| ESC9 | msPKI-Enrollment-Flag lacks STRONG_KEY_PROTECTION_REQUIRED and template has UPN mapping |
Spoof UPN, get cert |
| ESC10 | Weak certificate mapping (UPN-only, no SID extension) | Same as ESC9 but for kerberos PKINIT |
| ESC11 | RPC binding without packet integrity | Relay over RPC instead of HTTP |
| ESC13 | Template grants OID group membership (ADCS-managed groups) | Get cert → become member of high-priv group |
| ESC14 | Specific weak ACE patterns on cert templates | Edit template, ESC1-chain |
| ESC15 | EKUwu — EKU manipulation on V1 templates |
Add Client Auth EKU to a template that lacked it |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 131 lines · 94 tokens per session scan B 947d3922a74d
ad-certipy-esc-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,491 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 94 tokens to every session and 1,662 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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idea-generation
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secretary
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python-lib-analyzer
Analyze any Python library structure, explore modules, classes, and functions with signatures and documentation.
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