Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill containergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/container)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/container"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/container/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/container"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/container.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00053 | $0.00700 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.00350 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00140 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00070 |
Grade A, and why
container scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
92% identical to container-overview — 2 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 47 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container / Kubernetes Attack Category
This is a routing skill for cloud-native engagements. Identify the surface, then load the matching sub-skill.
Sub-skills
| Sub-skill | Covers | When to load |
|---|---|---|
| k8s-pod-escape | Privileged container, hostPath escape, hostPID + SYS_PTRACE, runC CVE chains, cgroup release agent | RCE inside a pod, goal is node compromise |
| k8s-rbac-abuse | auth can-i --list, pods/exec on privileged pods, secrets get/list, escalate verb, bind verb, impersonate, nodes/proxy |
You have a ServiceAccount token; goal is cluster-admin |
| docker-socket-mount | /var/run/docker.sock or containerd socket mounted in → instant host root |
CI runners, ArgoCD/Flux, DinD, Jenkins agents |
| container-cve | Catalog of high-impact runtime CVEs — Leaky Vessels, runC 2019-5736, BuildKit chain, CRI-O 2022-0811 | Container runtime version fingerprinted |
Quick routing
Container target identified?
├── You have RCE in a pod / container → k8s-pod-escape
├── You have a Kubernetes SA token → k8s-rbac-abuse
├── Socket mounted (`docker.sock`, etc.) → docker-socket-mount
├── Runtime version is old / vulnerable → container-cve
└── Unknown / all of above → start with k8s-pod-escape's Phase 1
Tooling
| Tool | Use |
|---|---|
kubectl |
API-level enumeration and abuse |
kube-hunter |
Automated cluster vulnerability scan |
kdigger |
In-cluster recon (Quarkslab) |
peirates |
Kubernetes-specific privilege escalation |
botb |
Container break-out (Brad-Beam et al.) |
nsenter |
Cross-namespace process / mount entry |
crictl / ctr / nerdctl |
containerd / CRI direct access |
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 47 lines · 53 tokens per session scan A 5212364324b9
container is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 53 tokens to every session and 700 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 92% identical to container-overview, differing in 2 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
cloud-workload-protection
../../../cloud-infra/cloud-workload-protection/SKILL.md.
container-image-scan
../../../cloud-infra/container-image-scan/SKILL.md.
scanning-containers-with-trivy-in-cicd
This skill covers integrating Aqua Security's Trivy scanner into CI/CD pipelines for comprehensive container image vulnerability detection. It addresses scanning Docker images for OS package and application dependency CVEs, detecting misconfigurations in Dockerfiles, scanning filesystem and git repositories, and…
performing-container-security-scanning-with-trivy
Scan container images, filesystems, and Kubernetes manifests for vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, exposed secrets, and license compliance issues using Aqua Security Trivy with SBOM generation and CI/CD integration.
cis-aws-foundations-2.1.3
Ensure Organizations management account is not used for workloads.
cis-aws-foundations-2.5
Ensure MFA is enabled for the 'root' user account.