Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add jaskaranhundal/usap-skills --skill container-image-scangit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jaskaranhundal/usap-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/container-image-scan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/container-image-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/container-image-scan/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/container-image-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jaskaranhundal/usap-skills/container-image-scan.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00012 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00006 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00002 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00001 |
Grade A, and why
container-image-scan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
../../../cloud-infra/container-image-scan/SKILL.md
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago Changed · -157 lines · -65 tokens per session a04c53b0c7dc
- 11d ago First seen · 158 lines · 65 tokens per session scan A 3be652cfa553
container-image-scan is a skill published in the GitHub repository jaskaranhundal/usap-skills (4 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 12 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other skills, from other repositories
container
Container / Kubernetes attack category — pod escape, RBAC abuse, runtime CVE exploitation, socket-mount escape. Routing skill: identify the surface (pod-internal RCE vs API-level vs build-pipeline), then load the matching sub-skill.
k8s-pivot
Kubernetes attack playbook — service-account token theft, RBAC abuse, pod escape, hostPath mount abuse, kube-api-server pivoting.
k8s-pod-escape
Kubernetes pod escape to node — privileged container abuse, hostPath mount escape, hostPID/hostIPC, capability misuse (SYSADMIN, SYSPTRACE), runC CVE chains. Pivots from RCE-in-pod to full node compromise.
container-cve
High-impact container-runtime CVE catalog — runC Leaky Vessels (CVE-2024-21626/-23651/-23652/-23653), CVE-2022-0185 (FUSE/legacy-fs), CVE-2019-5736 (runC binary replace), CRI-O Dirty COW analogs, Kubernetes API server CVE-2019-11247 (custom-resource RBAC bypass). Fingerprint → match → exploit.
k8s-rbac-abuse
Kubernetes RBAC privilege escalation paths — ClusterRole/Role enumeration via kubectl auth can-i --list, abuse of pods/exec, pods/portforward, secrets get, escalate verb, bind verb, impersonate verb, system:masters group abuse, ServiceAccount token theft and reuse.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.