Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill oauthgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/oauth)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/oauth"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/oauth/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/oauth"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/oauth.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.01803 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00901 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00361 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00180 |
Grade A, and why
oauth scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s https://target/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq This is a copy
100% identical to oauth — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 168 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
OAuth / OIDC Attack Playbook
OAuth bugs are the single highest-paying ATO vector in modern bug bounty. Every B2B SaaS has an OAuth surface; many implement it wrong.
1. Map the flow
# Discovery
curl -s https://target/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq
# Key endpoints to identify:
# - /authorize (where redirect_uri/client_id/scope arrive)
# - /token (where code exchanges for tokens)
# - /userinfo (claims about user)
# - /jwks.json (signing keys, see jwt/SKILL.md)
# - /revoke (sometimes overpermissive)
Capture a normal flow in Burp. Note: client_id, redirect_uri, state,
scope, response_type, code_challenge (PKCE).
2. Attack surface
2.1 redirect_uri bypass
The #1 OAuth bug class. Server's allowlist regex is too loose:
| Bypass | Example |
|---|---|
| Path append | https://target.com/callback/../../evil |
| Subdomain wildcard | https://target.com.evil.com/cb (server matches *.target.com) |
| Userinfo trick | https://[email protected]/cb |
| Path-traversal in fragment | https://target.com/cb#@evil.com |
| Open-redirect chain | redirect_uri=https://target.com/known-redirect?to=evil.com |
| Localhost / loopback | redirect_uri=http://localhost:1337 (often allowlisted) |
data: URI |
redirect_uri=data:text/html,<script>... (rare but devastating) |
| Mixed-protocol | http:// accepted where https:// required |
| URL-encoded slash | https://target.com%2Fcallback%[email protected] |
| Different fragment behavior | redirect_uri=https://evil.com#https://target.com/cb |
Test ALL of these. paramspider + Burp Intruder w/ payload list = systematic.
2.2 State parameter missing / weak (CSRF)
state should bind the auth request to the user's session. Missing or
predictable state → attacker initiates OAuth in own browser, sends victim
the URL, victim clicks → attacker's account now linked to victim's identity.
GET /authorize?response_type=code
&client_id=...
&redirect_uri=https://target.com/cb
&state= ← empty or predictable
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 168 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A 25a010cb53a4
oauth is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 1,803 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). It is 100% identical to oauth, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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