Anthropic Cybersecurity Skills is a library of structured cybersecurity procedures for AI agents, covering security domains and mappings to established security frameworks. It is for authorized security analysis, penetration testing, incident response, research, defense, and education across compatible AI platforms. The catalogue entries package parts of this library as agent skills, instructions, or a plugin.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills --skill analyzing-linux-system-artifactsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-SkillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/analyzing-linux-system-artifacts)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/analyzing-linux-system-artifacts"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/analyzing-linux-system-artifacts/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/analyzing-linux-system-artifacts"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills/analyzing-linux-system-artifacts.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk fail
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 12 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 89 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 106 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 90 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 125 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high YARA Match · line 156 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high Tool Misuse · line 207 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 209 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 209 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 207 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 207 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 210 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 324 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00079 | $0.04135 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.02067 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00827 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00413 |
Grade A, and why
analyzing-linux-system-artifacts scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
7 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- analyzing-linux-system-artifacts — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
- analyzing-linux-system-artifacts — 92% identical, 25 lines differ
- analyzing-linux-system-artifacts — 92% identical, 25 lines differ
- analyzing-linux-system-artifacts — 92% identical, 25 lines differ
- analyzing-linux-system-artifacts — 92% identical, 25 lines differ
- analyzing-linux-system-artifacts — 91% identical, 13 lines differ
- analyzing-linux-system-artifacts — 88% identical, 9 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 340 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Analyzing Linux System Artifacts
When to Use
- When investigating a compromised Linux server or workstation
- For identifying persistence mechanisms (cron, systemd, SSH keys)
- When tracing user activity through shell history and authentication logs
- During incident response to determine the scope of a Linux-based breach
- For detecting rootkits, backdoors, and unauthorized modifications
Prerequisites
- Forensic image or live access to the Linux system (read-only)
- Understanding of Linux file system hierarchy (FHS)
- Knowledge of common Linux logging locations (/var/log/)
- Tools: chkrootkit, rkhunter, AIDE, auditd logs
- Familiarity with systemd, cron, and PAM configurations
- Root access for complete artifact collection
Workflow
Step 1: Mount and Collect System Artifacts
# Mount forensic image read-only
mount -o ro,loop,offset=$((2048*512)) /cases/case-2024-001/images/linux_evidence.dd /mnt/evidence
# Create collection directories
mkdir -p /cases/case-2024-001/linux/{logs,config,users,persistence,network}
# Collect authentication logs
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/auth.log* /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/secure* /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/syslog* /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/kern.log* /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/audit/audit.log* /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/wtmp /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/btmp /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/lastlog /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
cp /mnt/evidence/var/log/faillog /cases/case-2024-001/linux/logs/
# Collect user artifacts
for user_dir in /mnt/evidence/home/*/; do
username=$(basename "$user_dir")
mkdir -p /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username
cp "$user_dir"/.bash_history /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username/ 2>/dev/null
cp "$user_dir"/.zsh_history /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username/ 2>/dev/null
cp -r "$user_dir"/.ssh/ /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username/ 2>/dev/null
cp "$user_dir"/.bashrc /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username/ 2>/dev/null
cp "$user_dir"/.profile /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username/ 2>/dev/null
cp "$user_dir"/.viminfo /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username/ 2>/dev/null
cp "$user_dir"/.wget-hsts /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username/ 2>/dev/null
cp "$user_dir"/.python_history /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/$username/ 2>/dev/null
done
# Collect root user artifacts
cp /mnt/evidence/root/.bash_history /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/root/ 2>/dev/null
cp -r /mnt/evidence/root/.ssh/ /cases/case-2024-001/linux/users/root/ 2>/dev/null
# Collect system configuration
cp /mnt/evidence/etc/passwd /cases/case-2024-001/linux/config/
cp /mnt/evidence/etc/shadow /cases/case-2024-001/linux/config/
cp /mnt/evidence/etc/group /cases/case-2024-001/linux/config/
cp /mnt/evidence/etc/sudoers /cases/case-2024-001/linux/config/
cp -r /mnt/evidence/etc/sudoers.d/ /cases/case-2024-001/linux/config/
cp /mnt/evidence/etc/hosts /cases/case-2024-001/linux/config/
cp /mnt/evidence/etc/resolv.conf /cases/case-2024-001/linux/config/
cp -r /mnt/evidence/etc/ssh/ /cases/case-2024-001/linux/config/
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 340 lines · 79 tokens per session scan E 6e8d44dc4f4a
analyzing-linux-system-artifacts is a skill published in the GitHub repository mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills (32,541 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 79 tokens to every session and 4,135 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
analyzing-linux-system-artifacts
Examine Linux system artifacts including auth logs, cron jobs, shell history, and system configuration to uncover evidence of compromise or unauthorized activity.
analyzing-linux-system-artifacts
Examine Linux system artifacts including auth logs, cron jobs, shell history, and system configuration to uncover evidence of compromise or unauthorized activity.
analyzing-linux-system-artifacts
Examine Linux system artifacts including auth logs, cron jobs, shell history, and system configuration to uncover evidence of compromise or unauthorized activity.
analyzing-linux-system-artifacts
A guide to examining Linux system traces such as login records, scheduled tasks, shell history, and system settings for signs of intrusion or unauthorized activity.
analyzing-linux-system-artifacts
Examine Linux system artifacts including auth logs, cron jobs, shell history, and system configuration to uncover evidence of compromise or unauthorized activity.
analyzing-linux-system-artifacts
Examine Linux system artifacts including auth logs, cron jobs, shell history, and system configuration to uncover evidence of compromise or unauthorized activity.