Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add niels-emmer/myace --skill security-checklistgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/niels-emmer/myaceWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/niels-emmer/myace/security-checklist)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/niels-emmer/myace/security-checklist"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/niels-emmer/myace/security-checklist/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/niels-emmer/myace/security-checklist"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/niels-emmer/myace/security-checklist.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00023 | $0.00809 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00404 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00162 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00081 |
Grade A, and why
Security Checklist scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 6d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 33 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Purpose
A security review without a structure tends to catch whatever the reviewer happens to think of that day and miss whatever they don't. This checklist gives a repeatable set of categories to walk through explicitly for any change that touches input handling, auth, data access, or external systems, so coverage doesn't depend on what's top of mind. It's the working tool behind the security-auditor agent, but it's usable by anyone reviewing a diff.
When to use it
For any change touching: user input (forms, query params, file uploads, API payloads), authentication or authorization logic, database queries, file paths or filesystem access, external API/network calls, cryptography or session/token handling, or dependency additions/updates. Skip it for changes with none of the above (e.g., a pure UI copy change) — mark the whole review N/A rather than force-fitting categories that don't apply.
The checklist
Walk each category and mark it PASS (verified, no issue), FAIL (issue found — blocking), or N/A (doesn't apply to this diff), with a one-line note for anything not PASS/N/A:
- Injection — Are all queries parameterized (no string-concatenated SQL)? Are shell commands built without interpolating untrusted input? Are file paths validated against traversal (
../) before use? Is user input reflected into templates/HTML escaped by default? - Authentication — Does this path require authentication where it should? Are session/token checks happening on every request that needs them, not just the first one in a flow?
- Authorization — Does this check ownership or permission, not just that the requester is logged in? (A logged-in user reaching another user's resource is the single most common authz bug — verify the check compares the resource's owner to the current user, not just
is_authenticated.) - Secrets handling — Are there any hardcoded credentials, API keys, or tokens in this diff? Are secrets read from environment/secret storage rather than committed config? Are secrets excluded from logs and error messages?
- Dependency risk — Is a new dependency actively maintained and from a trustworthy source? Does a version bump's changelog mention security fixes worth noting? Is the dependency's permission footprint (network access, filesystem access) proportionate to what it's used for?
- Data exposure — Does an API response or log line include more data than the caller needs (e.g., full user objects instead of the specific fields required)? Is PII handled consistent with how the rest of the codebase treats it?
- Cryptography and sessions, where relevant — Are standard library/vetted implementations used instead of hand-rolled crypto? Do session tokens have reasonable expiry and get invalidated on logout/password change?
- Input validation boundaries — Is untrusted input validated (type, length, format, range) at the boundary where it enters the system, not assumed valid deeper in the call stack?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 6d ago First seen · 33 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A bf4353cf8cba
Security Checklist is a skill published in the GitHub repository niels-emmer/myace (1 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 809 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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