Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection --skill containersgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collectionWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/containers)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/containers"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/containers/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/containers"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nimadorostkar/claude-skills-collection/containers.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector pass
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00038 | $0.01138 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00569 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00228 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00114 |
Grade A, and why
containers scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 104 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Containers
Purpose
Build container images that are small, cached effectively, and safe to run — not a 1.2 GB image running as root that rebuilds from scratch every time a source file changes.
When to Use
- Writing or reviewing a Dockerfile.
- Reducing image size or build time.
- Debugging a container that exits, hangs, or behaves differently from local development.
- Hardening images before a security review.
Capabilities
- Multi-stage builds and build-cache optimization.
- Base-image selection: distroless, Alpine, slim, and their trade-offs.
- Non-root users, read-only filesystems, and dropped capabilities.
- Signal handling and PID 1 semantics.
- Image scanning and SBOM generation.
Inputs
- The application, its runtime, and its build steps.
- The target platform (including whether ARM builds are required).
- Security and compliance requirements.
Outputs
- A multi-stage Dockerfile with an ordered, cache-friendly layer sequence.
- An image running as a non-root user, with no build tooling inside.
- A scan report with no critical vulnerabilities in the final image.
Workflow
- Order layers by change frequency — Dependency manifests first, dependency install second, source code last. Copying the source before installing dependencies invalidates the cache on every code change.
- Build in stages — A build stage with compilers and dev dependencies; a runtime stage containing only the artifact and its runtime. The compiler must not ship to production.
- Run as non-root — Create a user in the image and
USERit. A container running as root that is compromised is a root process on the node. - Handle signals — Use exec form (
CMD ["node", "server.js"]), not shell form. Shell form makes/bin/shPID 1, which does not forward SIGTERM, so your graceful shutdown never runs. - Scan and pin — Pin the base image by digest, scan the final image, and rebuild regularly to pick up base-image patches.
Best Practices
COPY package*.json ./thenRUN npm cithenCOPY . .— in that order. This is the single most impactful Dockerfile optimization and it is routinely written backwards.- Shell-form
CMDmeans your process is not PID 1 and will not receive SIGTERM. Every "why doesn't my container shut down gracefully" question has this answer. - Distroless or
scratchimages have no shell, which is excellent for security and inconvenient for debugging. Usekubectl debugor a debug variant tag. - A
.dockerignorethat excludes.git,node_modules, and build output can cut the build context from hundreds of megabytes to a few. latestis not a version. Pin by digest for reproducibility, or at minimum by an immutable tag.- Secrets passed as build args are baked into the image layers and recoverable. Use BuildKit secret mounts.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 104 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A e5a4695a507f
containers is a skill published in the GitHub repository nimadorostkar/Claude-Skills-collection (26 stars, last pushed 24d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 1,138 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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