Nx is a tool for managing monorepos, which are repositories containing multiple related projects, across TypeScript and other languages. It helps development teams and AI agents run only affected tasks, cache build results, generate code, and coordinate continuous integration. The catalogue add-ons provide agent skills, commands, agents, instructions, and settings for working with Nx.
Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to nrwl/nx. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nrwl/nx/master/.claude/skills/review-pr/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nrwl/nxWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/nrwl/nx/review-pr)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nrwl/nx/review-pr"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nrwl/nx/review-pr.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- Snyk warn
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 10 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 10 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 146 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 1395 Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.Fix: Remove instructions that suppress warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Let the agent surface safety-relevant caveats to the user.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1087 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 10 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 1417 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 1659 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00118 | $0.31187 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00059 | $0.15593 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00024 | $0.06237 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.03119 |
Grade A, and why
review-pr scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,705 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Deep PR Review (review-pr)
Runs this repo's review agents against a remote PR in nrwl/nx. The PR is checked out inside an isolated sandbox (gVisor on Linux, the Docker VM on macOS), the agents are dispatched with the PR's scope passed to them explicitly (Step 5), and their output is collected into a draft suitable for posting on GitHub.
Drafts only. This skill never posts to GitHub. The draft is reading material for the reviewer; if they want any of it on the PR, they post it themselves (or ask in the session, e.g. via gh pr review --body-file).
Trust model — why the sandbox
A PR is untrusted code. The dividing line is execution, not reading: the host may freely read public PR/issue information, but must never run PR-authored code (install scripts, builds, tests, the linked-issue reproduction). This skill enforces that with a strict split:
- Host (Claude + its credentials): reads GitHub metadata and the diff (
gh pr view/gh pr diff/gh issue view), orchestrates the agents, and reads the checked-out code only through.claude/tools/sandbox read/grep/find. Claude's auth token never enters the sandbox. - The sandbox: holds the PR checkout and is the only place any PR code executes — dependency installs, builds, tests, and the issue reproduction all run via
sandbox exec.
The CLI owns isolation, and nothing above it names a runtime. sandbox start probes the available backends, picks the boundary (gVisor on Linux, the VM on macOS), and refuses to start at all when it cannot get a real one. This is the one thing that used to be a variable here, and its failure mode was "no isolation, reported as success" — an unset RUNTIME_FLAG expanded to nothing, which is byte-identical to the correct macOS value. Do not reintroduce a runtime flag anywhere in this skill.
Consequences that the rest of this skill depends on:
- Never check the PR out into the host working tree. The checkout lives only inside the sandbox and is destroyed by
sandbox stop. - The review agents cannot use native
Read/Grep/Globfor PR source (those only see the host FS). They read it through the CLI, which presents identical commands whether the checkout is isolated or local — so no agent is ever told a native source read is an option.Readis still fine for host-side files this skill writes (the charter, the dumped diff). - If you ever catch yourself about to run
npm/pnpm/nx/a test/the repro on the host, stop — route it throughsandbox execinstead. See Step 3.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago Changed · +5 lines 91bf10090d68
- 8d ago First seen · 1,700 lines · 118 tokens per session scan A a8dfe22eda63
review-pr is a skill published in the GitHub repository nrwl/nx (29,318 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 118 tokens to every session and 31,187 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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e2e-reviewer
Use when reviewing Playwright or Cypress E2E specs, Page Objects (POM), PRs, pull requests, patches, diffs, or changed test files — asked to review tests, audit test quality, or find weak, flaky, or silently-passing tests; when tests pass CI but prove nothing or miss bugs; when auditing missing awaits, vacuous or…