Nx is a tool for managing monorepos, which are repositories containing multiple related projects, across TypeScript and other languages. It helps development teams and AI agents run only affected tasks, cache build results, generate code, and coordinate continuous integration. The catalogue add-ons provide agent skills, commands, agents, instructions, and settings for working with Nx.
Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to nrwl/nx. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nrwl/nx/master/.claude/skills/setup-review-sandbox/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/nrwl/nxWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/nrwl/nx/setup-review-sandbox)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nrwl/nx/setup-review-sandbox"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nrwl/nx/setup-review-sandbox/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nrwl/nx/setup-review-sandbox"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nrwl/nx/setup-review-sandbox.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 21 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 33 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 36 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 34 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 35 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 34 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 35 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Tool Misuse · line 64 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 4 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 19 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 33 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 34 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 35 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 36 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 37 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 38 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 61 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 64 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 19 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 54 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 55 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00117 | $0.01772 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00059 | $0.00886 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00023 | $0.00354 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00177 |
Grade B, and why
setup-review-sandbox scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
- **MISSING, Linux:** install Docker Engine, then `sudo systemctl enable --now docker` and add yourself to the `docker` group (`sudo usermod -aG docker $USER`, then re-login). Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y apt-transport-https ca-certificates curl gnupg How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 110 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Set up the review sandbox (one-time)
Installs and verifies everything the reproduce-issue skill / reproduce-verifier agent need to run untrusted PR code in isolation. Idempotent — each step checks first and only acts if needed. Steps needing sudo are handed to the user to run in their terminal (this skill cannot sudo non-interactively).
Run uname -s first — the path differs on Linux vs macOS.
1. Docker
docker info >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "docker OK" || echo "docker MISSING"
- MISSING, Linux: install Docker Engine, then
sudo systemctl enable --now dockerand add yourself to thedockergroup (sudo usermod -aG docker $USER, then re-login). - MISSING, macOS:
brew install colima dockerthencolima start(or install Docker Desktop).
2. Isolation runtime
Linux — gVisor (runsc)
docker info --format '{{range $k,$v := .Runtimes}}{{$k}} {{end}}' | grep -q runsc && echo "runsc OK" || echo "runsc MISSING"
If MISSING, have the user run this in their terminal (needs sudo; their shell is fish — exit codes are $status):
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y apt-transport-https ca-certificates curl gnupg
curl -fsSL https://gvisor.dev/archive.key | sudo gpg --dearmor -o /usr/share/keyrings/gvisor-archive-keyring.gpg
echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/gvisor-archive-keyring.gpg] https://storage.googleapis.com/gvisor/releases release main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/gvisor.list
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y runsc
sudo runsc install # registers runsc as a Docker runtime
sudo systemctl restart docker
Then re-check the runtime line above.
macOS — the Docker VM is the sandbox
No runsc. Just confirm the VM is up:
docker info >/dev/null 2>&1 && echo "docker VM OK" || echo "start it: colima start"
3. Container networking (catches the veth class of breakage)
docker run --rm --network none alpine true && echo "sandbox OK"
docker run --rm alpine true && echo "networking OK" || echo "networking BROKEN"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago Changed · +13 lines fa65d479c591
- 9d ago First seen · 97 lines · 117 tokens per session scan B 159910f33b0a
setup-review-sandbox is a skill published in the GitHub repository nrwl/nx (29,318 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 117 tokens to every session and 1,772 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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merge-seed
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add-component
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