Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/obsidian-owl/specwright/gate-securitynpx skills add Obsidian-Owl/specwright --skill gate-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Obsidian-Owl/specwrightWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00038 | $0.00730 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00365 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00146 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00073 |
Grade B, and why
gate-security scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Enumerates the file system for secretsmediumData exfiltration
Searching home directories for .env, .ssh, .aws or credential files is reconnaissance for credential theft.
- Scan for .env files, credential files, or key files staged for commit. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 79 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Gate: Security
Goal
Ensure the codebase doesn't leak secrets, introduce injection vulnerabilities, or expose sensitive data. Use real security tooling when available. Use LLM judgment for analysis that tools can't do.
Inputs
{projectArtifactsRoot}/config.json--commands.lint, SAST tool config if available{repoStateRoot}/work/{selectedWork.id}/workflow.json-- selected work unit- Changed files (detected via
git diff)
Outputs
- Evidence file at
{workDir}/evidence/security-report.md - Gate status in the selected work's
workflow.json - Findings shown inline with severity, location, and remediation
Constraints
Scope (MEDIUM freedom):
- Focus on changed files. Use
git diff --name-onlyagainst main branch. - If no changed files detected, check all files in work scope.
Phase 1 — Detection (LOW freedom, BLOCK severity):
- Scan for secrets: API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys in source files.
- Scan for .env files, credential files, or key files staged for commit.
- Check .gitignore covers sensitive patterns.
- If a configured SAST tool exists (e.g.,
semgrep,eslint-plugin-security), run it. - Any secret or credential found = BLOCK finding.
Phase 2 — Analysis (HIGH freedom, WARN severity):
- Review changed code for injection patterns (SQL, command, XSS, path traversal).
- Check that external data is treated as untrusted (per Constitution security practices).
- Check that authentication/authorization patterns aren't weakened (per Constitution auth/authz practices).
- Findings are WARN unless clearly exploitable (then BLOCK).
Phase 3 — Logical security (HIGH freedom, WARN severity):
- Missing authentication (CWE-306): mutation-capable handler functions (HTTP routes, gRPC handlers, GraphQL resolvers) performing state-changing operations without any visible auth check. Only flag when auth is completely absent. Skip if no mutation-capable handler patterns detected in changed files.
- For code-level error handling analysis (CWE-636, CWE-209), defer to gate-semantic which owns those categories with tiered tooling.
- All Phase 3 findings are WARN. Never BLOCK.
- Phase 3 focuses on logical control-flow; defer to Phase 2 when a finding is already captured as an injection pattern.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 79 lines · 38 tokens per session scan B 85db0e6fd992
gate-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository Obsidian-Owl/specwright (9 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 730 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (enumerates the file system for secrets). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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