Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add ogrodev/fsociety/plugin install elliotWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ogrodev/fsociety/cloud-lateral)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ogrodev/fsociety/cloud-lateral"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ogrodev/fsociety/cloud-lateral/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ogrodev/fsociety/cloud-lateral"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ogrodev/fsociety/cloud-lateral.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00374 | $0.04120 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00150 | $0.01648 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00075 | $0.00824 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00037 | $0.00412 |
Grade D, and why
cloud-lateral scanned grade D with 4 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Harvests environment variablesmediumData exfiltration
Enumerating or grepping the environment for keys collects credentials unrelated to what the mod says it does.
3. **Container escape -> node creds -> cluster admin -> secrets**: Break out of container, access node IMDS, escalate to cluster admin, dump all secrets Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
terraform state, cloud credentials file, .aws/credentials, gcloud auth, Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Cloud metadata endpointmediumServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
IMDS, metadata service, 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 342 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Cloud Lateral Movement
Cloud environments expose a fundamentally different attack surface from traditional networks. Identity IS the network -- IAM policies, service accounts, and managed identities replace firewalls and VLANs. A single misconfigured permission can grant access to every resource in an organization. This skill covers the full cloud attack lifecycle across AWS, Azure, and GCP for authorized penetration testing.
Attack Lifecycle
Follow this sequence. Each phase feeds the next -- credential harvesting enables escalation, escalation enables lateral movement, lateral movement discovers new targets.
Initial Access --> Credential Harvesting --> Permission Enumeration --> Privilege Escalation
| |
v v
Data Exfiltration <-- Persistence <-- Lateral Movement <-- Service Abuse
Phase 1 -- Initial Access and Cloud Fingerprinting
Before attacking, determine the cloud provider, account structure, and available attack surface.
Cloud provider indicators:
- AWS:
amazonaws.comdomains,X-Amz-*headers,arn:aws:patterns,.aws/credentials,169.254.169.254IMDS - Azure:
azure.com/windows.net/core.windows.netdomains,X-Ms-*headers, Entra ID endpoints,169.254.169.254withMetadata: true - GCP:
googleapis.comdomains,metadata.google.internal, service account JSON files,X-Goog-*headers
Log detected cloud info immediately:
node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/target-intel.js" add "<target>" "tech-stack" "cloud-provider" "<aws|azure|gcp>" --source scan
node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/target-intel.js" add "<target>" "tech-stack" "cloud-account-id" "<account/subscription/project>" --source scan
Common initial access vectors:
- SSRF to metadata service (most common cloud-specific vector)
- Exposed credentials in repos, environment variables, CI/CD pipelines
- Misconfigured storage buckets (public S3/Blob/GCS)
- Compromised web application running on cloud compute
- Leaked AWS keys in GitHub, terraform state, Docker images
- Cloud-init / user-data containing plaintext secrets
What ships with it
7 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 342 lines · 374 tokens per session scan D fde4a0cbae0c
cloud-lateral is a skill published in the GitHub repository ogrodev/fsociety (20 stars, last pushed 7mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 374 tokens to every session and 4,120 once invoked, about $0.0015 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it D with 4 findings (harvests environment variables, reaches for credential files, cloud metadata endpoint). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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