Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add OnlyTerp/hermes-optimization-guide --skill audit-approval-bypassgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/OnlyTerp/hermes-optimization-guideWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/onlyterp/hermes-optimization-guide/audit-approval-bypass)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/onlyterp/hermes-optimization-guide/audit-approval-bypass"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/onlyterp/hermes-optimization-guide/audit-approval-bypass.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 68 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 82 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 82 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 82 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 82 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 31 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 36 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.01117 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00558 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00223 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00112 |
Grade B, and why
audit-approval-bypass scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Recursive force deletemediumDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
- The hardline `UNRECOVERABLE_BLOCKLIST` (rm -rf /, fork bomb, mkfs on root, …) cannot be bypassed by any of the above — it's the floor, not the posture. Don't report it as configurable. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 88 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
audit-approval-bypass — Verify Approval Posture
Approval bypass is how power users make trusted automation run unattended. It's also how attackers escalate if misconfigured. This skill catches drift.
Hermes' approval layer is the built-in dangerous-command detector plus the top-level approvals: and command_allowlist: blocks — there is no security.approval.bypass_subagents / require_approval regex config (Part 19, Layer 2). The bypass surfaces that actually exist are the ones below.
Procedure
-
Load
~/.hermes/config.yamland capture:approvals.mode(manual/smart/off)approvals.timeoutandapprovals.cron_mode(deny/approve)- The full
command_allowlist:(every entry is a standing "always approve") terminal.backend(container backends skip approval entirely — by design)security.redact_secrets
-
Flag config-level bypasses:
- 🔴
approvals.mode: off— equivalent to permanent--yolo. - 🔴
approvals.cron_mode: approve— headless cron jobs auto-approve dangerous commands. - 🟡
approvals.mode: smarton a deployment that reads untrusted input — the auxiliary risk-assessor is itself operating on attacker-influenced strings. - 🟡 Any broad
command_allowlistentry (e.g.recursive delete,shell command via -c/-lc flag) — these approve every future match, including paths you didn't intend. - 🟡
security.redact_secrets: false.
- 🔴
-
Check environment bypasses:
HERMES_YOLO_MODEset in~/.hermes/.envor the service unit (check the systemd unit'sEnvironment=lines).- Any wrapper script / alias invoking
hermes --yolo.
-
Check the container caveat:
- If
terminal.backendisdocker/singularity/modal/daytona, dangerous-command checks are skipped — the container is the boundary. Verify that's intentional: flag ifdocker_mount_cwd_to_workspace: trueor a broad host mount undermines it.
- If
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 88 lines · 34 tokens per session scan B 866ec829b479
audit-approval-bypass is a skill published in the GitHub repository OnlyTerp/hermes-optimization-guide (637 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 1,117 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
systematic-debugging
Use when encountering any bug, test failure, or unexpected behavior, before proposing fixes.
local-ai-agents
Build local-first AI agents that run entirely on a developer workstation with Microsoft Foundry Local and Qwen function-calling models. Covers Small Language Models (SLMs), the OpenAI-compatible local endpoint, sandboxed local tools, local RAG with Chroma, local MCP servers, hybrid cloud/local routing, and the…
next-cache-components-adoption
Turn on Cache Components in a Next.js app and resolve the blocking routes it surfaces. Use when the user wants to enable, adopt, or migrate to Cache Components, flip the cacheComponents flag, work through a flood of blocking-prerender / instant validation errors, run the cache-components-instant-false codemod, or…
next-cache-components-optimizer
Drive a Next.js route to instant navigation by setting up an agentic loop, under Cache Components / PPR, on initial load (hard navigation) and client-side navigation (soft navigation). Encode the goal as a failing @next/playwright instant() e2e and work it to green, one verified route at a time; the shipped test then…
next-partial-prefetching-adoption
Turn on Partial Prefetching in a Next.js app and work through the insights it surfaces. Use when the user wants to enable or adopt Partial Prefetching, flip the partialPrefetching flag, opt routes in with export const prefetch = 'partial', audit Link prefetch={true} behavior, preserve existing prefetched UI with…
chronicle
Analyze Copilot session history for standup reports, usage tips, session search, and session reindexing. Use when the user asks for a standup, daily summary, usage tips, workflow recommendations, wants to search or find past sessions by keyword/file/PR, wants to reindex their session store, or asks about deleting…