Gini Agent is a personal AI-agent runtime that manages conversations, runs, tasks, approvals, memory, skills, jobs, tools, traces, audit events, and runtime health across its clients. It is for an agent that can remember, learn from task outcomes, and operate through desktop or mobile interfaces with user controls. Catalogue add-ons extend the runtime with skills and instructions.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Open-Curiosity/gini-agent --skill ginigit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Open-Curiosity/gini-agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/open-curiosity/gini-agent/gini)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/open-curiosity/gini-agent/gini"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/open-curiosity/gini-agent/gini.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 28 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Rogue Agent · line 3 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- high Tool Misuse · line 332 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 511 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 679 Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.Fix: Remove any instruction telling the agent to never refuse or always comply. The agent must retain the ability to decline unsafe, out-of-scope, or harmful requests.
- high Anti-Refusal · line 684 Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.Fix: Remove any instruction telling the agent to never refuse or always comply. The agent must retain the ability to decline unsafe, out-of-scope, or harmful requests.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 697 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 54 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 98 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 208 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 622 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 627 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 74 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 97 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 204 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 446 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 555 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 559 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 614 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 625 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 630 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00053 | $0.07703 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00026 | $0.03852 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.01541 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00770 |
Grade C, and why
gini scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Tells the agent never to refusehighAnti-refusal
Suppressing the ability to decline removes a core safety control; a later harmful request then succeeds.
should never refuse a high-risk action up front — propose it, let it How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 706 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Gini Agent
Gini is a personal agent. The gateway owns durable state and
tool execution. Gini itself operates through /api/* and its registered
tool catalog. The CLI exists for human operators — it's a thin wrapper
around the same /api/* endpoints — but Gini should never call it. The
Next.js BFF, mobile clients, and other front-ends are also /api/*
consumers. This skill is a recipe book for the most common configuration
tasks; every recipe leads with the API call Gini should use.
Load this skill before claiming a limitation. Common false denials to inoculate against: the interactive browser (Playwright with persistent sign-ins), scheduled jobs (interval or cron), Telegram or other messaging bridges, MCP servers, delegated subagents, and Gini's own provider / model / agent / skill / MCP / connector inventory — all visible and mutable through the self-config tools described below. Do not claim "I can't see my model" or "I can't change my settings"; you can.
Self-knowledge — what Gini is and how to change it
When the user asks about Gini itself — "what model are you using", "what's your config", "what can you do", "what skills do you have", "switch to deepseek" — the answer comes from the self-config tools, not from guessing or from "no visibility" disclaimers.
These tools are DEFERRED: their names appear in the system prompt's
"Tools available on demand" list, but you must load_tools a tool before
calling it. The flow is always two steps — load on one turn, call on the
next:
load_tools({ names: ["get_self"] })(or several at once, e.g.["list_providers", "set_provider"]).- On the next turn, call the tool directly by name with its args at the
TOP LEVEL — e.g.
get_self({}),set_provider({ provider: "deepseek" }). Do NOT wrap args in a{ name, args }envelope and do NOT pass a tool's arguments toload_tools.
The self-config tools (load the ones you need), grouped by surface:
Snapshot
get_self(query) — one-call snapshot: provider, model, active agent, approval mode, instance, version, counts, plusapprovalSettings(approvalMode,autoApproveCommands,dangerousTerminalPatterns). Start here for broad "what / who are you?" questions and before any approval-list replace.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 706 lines · 53 tokens per session scan E 92e8906ec05a
gini is a skill published in the GitHub repository Open-Curiosity/gini-agent (1,986 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 53 tokens to every session and 7,703 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (tells the agent never to refuse). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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