switchbot

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

• high Privilege Escalation · line 121
  Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
  Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
• high Anti-Refusal · line 198
  Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.
  Fix: Remove jailbreak framing that nullifies safety policies or restrictions. Skill content must not instruct the agent to ignore its guidelines or operate without guardrails.
• high Prompt Injection · line 198
  This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Remove or rewrite any text that instructs the agent to ignore prompts, override safety rules, or trust unverified content. Ensure skill content cannot be injected to alter agent behavior.
• medium Agent Snooping · line 212
  Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
  Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.