SuiteCloud SDK is a collection of tools for customizing NetSuite accounts and building SuiteApps through the SuiteCloud Development Framework. It serves developers through a command-line interface, Visual Studio Code extension, unit-testing tools, and agent skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add oracle/netsuite-suitecloud-sdk --skill netsuite-owasp-secure-codinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/oracle/netsuite-suitecloud-sdkWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/oracle/netsuite-suitecloud-sdk/netsuite-owasp-secure-coding)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oracle/netsuite-suitecloud-sdk/netsuite-owasp-secure-coding"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oracle/netsuite-suitecloud-sdk/netsuite-owasp-secure-coding/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oracle/netsuite-suitecloud-sdk/netsuite-owasp-secure-coding"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oracle/netsuite-suitecloud-sdk/netsuite-owasp-secure-coding.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 23 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 3 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Tool Misuse · line 456 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 456 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 456 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- high Tool Misuse · line 456 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1173 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1214 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Prompt Injection · line 1412 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 1668 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 1999 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 2422 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Output Handling · line 2458 Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.Fix: Validate and sanitize all model output before using it in downstream contexts. Use parameterized queries for SQL, shell quoting for commands, and HTML encoding for web output.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 448 Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.Fix: Restrict tool access to only the tools required for the skill's stated purpose. Use an explicit allowlist rather than granting blanket access.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 650 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 677 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 1479 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 1492 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1847 Skill allows unbounded resource consumption (API calls, storage, compute). Without rate limits or quotas, a compromised or misbehaving agent can cause denial-of-service or cost overruns.Fix: Set explicit rate limits, timeouts, and resource quotas for API calls, file operations, and compute. Implement circuit breakers for runaway loops.
- medium Output Handling · line 1899 Output size or generation rate is not bounded. Unbounded output enables denial-of-service through resource exhaustion, log flooding, or context-window stuffing.Fix: Set explicit limits on output length, generation count, and rate. Use max_tokens and truncation to prevent unbounded output.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 2087 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00088 | $0.25736 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00035 | $0.10294 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.05147 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.02574 |
Grade A, and why
netsuite-owasp-secure-coding scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
The source is not reproduced here
Licensed UPL-1.0
The repository is licensed UPL-1.0, which this catalogue does not treat as permission to reproduce the file. Read it at the source.
What ships with it
15 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
- quick-reference.md 24 KB
- references/01-injection-prevention.md 17 KB
- references/02-authentication-session.md 20 KB
- references/03-xss-output-encoding.md 25 KB
- references/04-access-control.md 25 KB
- references/05-security-misconfiguration.md 27 KB
- references/06-cryptography-data-protection.md 19 KB
- references/07-file-upload-download.md 24 KB
- references/08-api-restlet-security.md 29 KB
- references/09-client-side-security.md 30 KB
- references/10-logging-monitoring.md 39 KB
- references/appendices/appendix-ai-agent-security.md 9.4 KB
- references/appendices/appendix-csp-header-templates.md 13 KB
- references/appendices/appendix-security-checklist.md 13 KB
- references/appendices/appendix-suitescript-security-patterns.md 27 KB
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 3,074 lines · 88 tokens per session scan E ac50407912b2
netsuite-owasp-secure-coding is a skill published in the GitHub repository oracle/netsuite-suitecloud-sdk (357 stars, last pushed today), licensed UPL-1.0. It adds 88 tokens to every session and 25,736 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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