Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/outlinedriven/odin-codex-plugin/security-reviewnpx skills add OutlineDriven/odin-codex-plugin --skill security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/OutlineDriven/odin-codex-pluginWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/outlinedriven/odin-codex-plugin/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/outlinedriven/odin-codex-plugin/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/outlinedriven/odin-codex-plugin/security-review.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00066 | $0.01354 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00677 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00271 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00135 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- security-review — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 75 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat modeling is hypothesis generation for an adversary. Walk the change set as the attacker would: where does untrusted input enter, what trust boundary does it cross, what does it gain on the other side. Every unaudited path is a free move for the attacker.
When to Apply / NOT
Apply: new external surface (HTTP route, RPC method, file upload); AuthN/AuthZ change; deserialization / parsing of untrusted input; new dependency or major-version upgrade; cryptographic change; pre-release of public-facing service; incident postmortem.
NOT apply: internal refactor with no trust-boundary delta; pure performance work; documentation-only changes; internal-only experimental code.
Anti-patterns
- Allowlist-by-omission: treating "no obvious issue" as "secure".
- Crypto improvisation: hand-rolling primitives.
- Trust the client: validating only client-side.
- Logging secrets: tokens, PII, session cookies in logs.
- Default-permit ACL: authorization checks on opt-in basis.
- Magic-string config: secrets in source / env files.
- Outdated SBOM: stale dependency snapshots.
- Skipping the threat model: jumping to checklist without naming assets/actors/boundaries.
STRIDE Question Template
Apply each prompt to every component touched by the change.
| Letter | Threat | Required questions |
|---|---|---|
| S | Spoofing | Who is the principal? How is identity proven? Can the credential be forged, replayed, or stolen? Is MFA / mutual-auth enforced? |
| T | Tampering | What inputs cross the trust boundary? Are they validated against an explicit schema (Zod / Pydantic / serde)? Are messages integrity-protected (HMAC / signature / TLS)? |
| R | Repudiation | Are security-relevant actions logged with actor + timestamp + outcome? Are logs append-only / tamper-evident? |
| I | Information Disclosure | What data is returned in error paths, logs, telemetry? Are PII / secrets ever serialized? Are timing side-channels addressed (constant-time compare)? |
| D | Denial of Service | Are inputs bounded (size, count, depth)? Is parsing resource-limited (zip-bomb, billion-laughs, ReDoS)? Are external calls rate-limited? |
| E | Elevation of Privilege | What privilege does the new code execute under? Is least privilege honored? Can input alter privilege (path traversal, SQL injection, deserialization gadget)? |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 75 lines · 66 tokens per session scan A 787d0d74e2ca
security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository OutlineDriven/odin-codex-plugin (15 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 1,354 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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