Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add OutlineDriven/odin-gemini-cli-extension --skill security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/OutlineDriven/odin-gemini-cli-extensionWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/outlinedriven/odin-gemini-cli-extension/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/outlinedriven/odin-gemini-cli-extension/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/outlinedriven/odin-gemini-cli-extension/security-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/outlinedriven/odin-gemini-cli-extension/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/outlinedriven/odin-gemini-cli-extension/security-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00066 | $0.01354 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00677 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00271 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00135 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
100% identical to security-review — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 75 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Threat modeling is hypothesis generation for an adversary. Walk the change set as the attacker would: where does untrusted input enter, what trust boundary does it cross, what does it gain on the other side. Every unaudited path is a free move for the attacker.
When to Apply / NOT
Apply: new external surface (HTTP route, RPC method, file upload); AuthN/AuthZ change; deserialization / parsing of untrusted input; new dependency or major-version upgrade; cryptographic change; pre-release of public-facing service; incident postmortem.
NOT apply: internal refactor with no trust-boundary delta; pure performance work; documentation-only changes; internal-only experimental code.
Anti-patterns
- Allowlist-by-omission: treating "no obvious issue" as "secure".
- Crypto improvisation: hand-rolling primitives.
- Trust the client: validating only client-side.
- Logging secrets: tokens, PII, session cookies in logs.
- Default-permit ACL: authorization checks on opt-in basis.
- Magic-string config: secrets in source / env files.
- Outdated SBOM: stale dependency snapshots.
- Skipping the threat model: jumping to checklist without naming assets/actors/boundaries.
STRIDE Question Template
Apply each prompt to every component touched by the change.
| Letter | Threat | Required questions |
|---|---|---|
| S | Spoofing | Who is the principal? How is identity proven? Can the credential be forged, replayed, or stolen? Is MFA / mutual-auth enforced? |
| T | Tampering | What inputs cross the trust boundary? Are they validated against an explicit schema (Zod / Pydantic / serde)? Are messages integrity-protected (HMAC / signature / TLS)? |
| R | Repudiation | Are security-relevant actions logged with actor + timestamp + outcome? Are logs append-only / tamper-evident? |
| I | Information Disclosure | What data is returned in error paths, logs, telemetry? Are PII / secrets ever serialized? Are timing side-channels addressed (constant-time compare)? |
| D | Denial of Service | Are inputs bounded (size, count, depth)? Is parsing resource-limited (zip-bomb, billion-laughs, ReDoS)? Are external calls rate-limited? |
| E | Elevation of Privilege | What privilege does the new code execute under? Is least privilege honored? Can input alter privilege (path traversal, SQL injection, deserialization gadget)? |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 75 lines · 66 tokens per session scan A 787d0d74e2ca
security-review is a skill published in the GitHub repository OutlineDriven/odin-gemini-cli-extension (5 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 1,354 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to security-review, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other skills, from other repositories
ast-grep
Code search, analysis, and refactoring using ast-grep (sg). Use for AST-based code modifications, structural search, and linting.
cleanup-codebase
Reduce concepts, duplication, and ceremony in internal code while touching nearby code. Use when working an existing path and you spot dead fields, redundant wrappers, or speculative abstractions; distinct from refactor-break-bw-compat (internal hygiene, not public API removal).
pr-reviews
Review code changes on a given GitHub PR using gh CLI. Use when the user asks to review a pull request, analyze PR diffs, or provide feedback on open PRs with structured quality, security, and testing assessments.
reviews
Review the code changes on the current branch. Use when the user asks to review their current work, analyze recent commits, or get a code quality assessment of the active branch against the main branch.
resolve
Resolve code review comments by verifying validity, then proposing multiple architectural solutions (not naive fixes) for confirmed issues. Use when addressing review feedback or analyzing comment validity.
gh-address-comments
Help address review/issue comments on the open GitHub PR for the current branch using gh CLI; verify gh auth first and prompt the user to authenticate if not logged in.