Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to padamson/playwright-rust. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/padamson/playwright-rust/main/.claude/skills/supply-chain/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/padamson/playwright-rustWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/padamson/playwright-rust/supply-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/padamson/playwright-rust/supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/padamson/playwright-rust/supply-chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/padamson/playwright-rust/supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/padamson/playwright-rust/supply-chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Excessive Agency · line 33 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00041 | $0.01356 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00542 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00271 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00136 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply Chain & Release Hygiene
The project uses three complementary supply-chain tools:
cargo audit— vulnerability advisories from RustSeccargo deny— license, duplicate, and source policycargo vet— explicit audit chain for every dependency
All three run in CI on every push and every dependabot PR. Treat their
output as load-bearing — a real cargo audit failure is a security
advisory and warrants a patch release; a cargo vet failure usually
means an audit chain needs re-stitching after a version change.
When bumping our own version
Nothing to do in supply-chain/. Each published workspace crate has
[policy.<crate>] audit-as-crates-io = false in supply-chain/config.toml,
so vet treats it as our own code and never asks for an audit of it, at
any version. Bump Cargo.toml, let Cargo.lock follow, and run
cargo vet as usual.
The policy used to be true, which made vet treat the path crates as
third-party crates.io code. Every bump then needed a
[[unpublished]] entry in imports.lock chained to an exemption for the
last published version, and the exemption had to be bumped by hand when
the chain broke. If either of those reappears, the policy has been
flipped back.
supply-chain/imports.lock is generated, never hand-edited. Its
header comment says # cargo-vet imports lock.
When external dependencies update (dependabot PRs)
Dependabot PRs that bump external crates often surface "missing
[safe-to-deploy]" or "missing [safe-to-run]" failures from
cargo vet. Resolve by either:
- Running
cargo vet diff <crate> <old> <new>andcargo vet certifyto record an explicit audit (preferred for small, reviewable diffs), or - Adding an exemption in
supply-chain/config.toml(acceptable for well-known crates with negligible delta — match the existing exemption style).
Clearing a vet failure, step by step
Run cargo vet without --locked first. With --locked it cannot
refresh imports.lock, so it misses the publisher trust and imported
audits for the new versions and reports crates CI does not. Then settle
each crate it lists one of three ways:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago Changed · +51 lines 57e27769061b
- 17d ago Changed · +1 lines 14e856e54159
- 1mo ago First seen · 65 lines · 41 tokens per session scan A 48f430c01eb5
supply-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository padamson/playwright-rust (163 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 41 tokens to every session and 1,356 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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