Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add pasky/pi-side-agents --skill agent-setupgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/pasky/pi-side-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/pasky/pi-side-agents/agent-setup)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pasky/pi-side-agents/agent-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pasky/pi-side-agents/agent-setup/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pasky/pi-side-agents/agent-setup"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pasky/pi-side-agents/agent-setup.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Rogue Agent · line 32 Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.Fix: Prevent the skill from modifying its own code, SKILL.md, or configuration files. Treat skill files as read-only at runtime.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 103 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Tool Misuse · line 209 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 242 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00024 | $0.03322 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.01329 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00664 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00332 |
Grade A, and why
agent-setup scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 343 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Parallel Agent Setup
Set up the pi-side-agents lifecycle scripts for this project.
Initial first time setup (no .pi/side-agent* yet): Work through two phases: interview, then file creation. Finish by backing up this agent-setup SKILL.md to .pi/side-agents/agent-start~/ for easy future upgrades.
Update setup: Chat with the user about what needs changing, use file examples below as reference for comparison.
Upgrade setup to new pi-side-agents version: Diff this file with the current backup .pi/side-agents/agent-start~/
and discuss the changes to apply (or not) with the user. When upgrade is finished, update the backup to the current version.
Important (local-only files): everything this skill creates is under .pi/ and is runtime/local configuration. Do not git add, git add -f, or commit these files. They should remain untracked. If they were accidentally committed, remove them from git tracking while keeping them locally.
Phase 1: Interview
Ask the user the following questions. You may ask them all at once or one at a time — use your judgment based on how they engage.
-
Main branch name – What is the primary integration branch? (default:
main) -
Bootstrap steps – Does each agent worktree need custom setup before work begins? For example:
npm install, copying.envfiles, running migrations. If yes, what commands specifically? -
Finish policy – When an agent finishes, should it:
- Rebase locally, then fast-forward into the main branch in the parent checkout (default), or
- Open a pull request instead?
-
Overwrite existing files – If
.pi/side-agent-start.shor similar already exist, overwrite them? (default: no — skip existing files)
Before asking the questions, autonomously try to answer questions 1, 2 and 4, and propose project-specific answers to the user.
Collect all answers before proceeding to Phase 2.
Phase 2: Create Setup Files
Determine the git repo root:
GIT_ROOT=$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed · +29 lines 28f939417e3b
- 2mo ago First seen · 314 lines · 24 tokens per session scan A 8171340b674c
agent-setup is a skill published in the GitHub repository pasky/pi-side-agents (196 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 24 tokens to every session and 3,322 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
agent-setup compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| agent-setuppasky/pi-side-agents | Skill | 196 | 4d ago | MIT | A | 24 | Claude Code, Codex |
| imagegenopenai/codex | Skill | 134k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 113 | Codex |
| local-ai-agentsmicrosoft/ai-agents-for-beginners | Skill | 79k | yesterday | MIT | A | 200 | Claude Code, Codex |
| playwright-climicrosoft/playwright | Skill | 100k | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 19 | Claude Code |
| browser-automationopenclaw/openclaw | Skill | 394k | today | MIT | A | 36 | Claude Code |
| systematic-debuggingobra/superpowers | Skill | 314k | 4d ago | MIT | A | 21 | Claude Code |
| next-cache-components-adoptionvercel/next.js | Skill | 143k | today | MIT | A | 95 | Claude Code |