PentesterFlow is a terminal-based AI assistant for authorized penetration testing and bug hunting, guiding analysts through reconnaissance, testing, evidence gathering, and reporting while requiring human approval for sensitive actions. Security engineers use it with local or hosted language models and real security tools, and the catalogue add-ons extend its workflows.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PentesterFlow/agent --skill racegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PentesterFlow/agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/race)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/race"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pentesterflow/agent/race/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/race"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pentesterflow/agent/race.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 54 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 39 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 54 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00082 | $0.01044 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00033 | $0.00418 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00209 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00104 |
Grade A, and why
race scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
seq 50 | xargs -P 50 -I{} curl -s -X POST https://target/redeem \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 96 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Race / TOCTOU playbook
Confirm the target is in scope for stress-style testing (multiple parallel requests can look like abuse). Then identify the candidate operation.
Execution rule: capture a real request for the operation and replay that request with concrete cookies/body values. Never write literal placeholders such as <sess> to files; ask once if a session or replayable request is missing.
Targets worth racing
- Redeem a gift card / promo code (does the second redeem succeed?)
- Cast a vote / claim a one-per-user reward
- Withdraw / transfer balance (does it deduct twice?)
- Submit a 2FA code (can N parallel guesses each be checked against an unused-attempts counter?)
- Apply a discount that's supposed to be once-per-cart
- Send a friend / invite request (creates duplicate rows / privileges)
- Confirm an email (mark verified twice with different addresses)
- Upload then read a file (write
safe.png, then race a swap toevil.svgbefore AV scans)
1. Burp-style "single packet attack" (last-byte sync) — preferred
Modern servers buffer HTTP/2 frames. The classic trick: send N requests where each is fully serialized except the last byte. Then in a single TCP write, flush the final byte of all N. The server receives them effectively simultaneously and dispatches them in parallel — bypassing nearly all software-side rate limiting.
You can do this with a small Go/Python script. Skeleton (Python, HTTP/2):
import asyncio, ssl
import httpx
async def main():
transport = httpx.AsyncHTTPTransport(http2=True)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport, verify=False) as c:
# Build N partial requests, then race the last byte.
# In practice: use turbo-intruder or a Go h2 client for byte-level control.
...
asyncio.run(main())
For the highest-fidelity version, use Burp Suite's Turbo Intruder (race-single-packet-attack.py template) — it's the de facto tool. The shell tool can run it if installed.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 96 lines · 82 tokens per session scan A 2bd287d25f17
race is a skill published in the GitHub repository PentesterFlow/agent (1,401 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 82 tokens to every session and 1,044 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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