PentesterFlow is a terminal-based AI assistant for authorized penetration testing and bug hunting, guiding analysts through reconnaissance, testing, evidence gathering, and reporting while requiring human approval for sensitive actions. Security engineers use it with local or hosted language models and real security tools, and the catalogue add-ons extend its workflows.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PentesterFlow/agent --skill supabasegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PentesterFlow/agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/supabase)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/supabase"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pentesterflow/agent/supabase/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/supabase"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pentesterflow/agent/supabase.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 127 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 178 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00120 | $0.03325 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00048 | $0.01330 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00665 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00332 |
Grade A, and why
supabase scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -ksS "https://TARGET/" -o /tmp/sb_index.html How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 252 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supabase RLS playbook
Supabase exposes PostgreSQL directly to the browser through PostgREST (/rest/v1/),
GoTrue auth (/auth/v1/), and Storage (/storage/v1/). The browser authenticates
with a public anon JWT, and the only thing standing between an anonymous attacker and
the database is Row-Level Security (RLS) policies. Misconfigured or missing RLS is the
entire bug class:
- RLS disclosure —
SELECTon a table returns rows it shouldn't (PII, tokens, other tenants). - RLS write abuse —
INSERT/UPDATE/DELETEsucceeds anonymously, so you can forge records the application trusts (a "certificate" / verification / license / entitlement row, an admin flag, a balance, someone else's data).
Authorized targets only. Treat the database as production: read a single marker row to prove disclosure, write ONE clearly-labelled marker row to prove write, then clean up. Never dump whole tables of real PII, never mass-modify, never
DELETEreal rows. The PoC is "I read/wrote one row I shouldn't be able to", not "I exfiltrated the customer base".
Execution rule: substitute the real Supabase project ref, anon key, table, and marker IDs before running commands. Never write literal placeholders such as <ref>, <table>, <col>, or <returned-id> to files; if a value is unknown, discover it first or ask once.
0. Find the project URL + anon key in the frontend JS
The project ref and anon key are meant to be public — they ship in the client bundle. You need both before you can talk to the API.
# Pull the main page + every script it references, then grep for the markers.
curl -ksS "https://TARGET/" -o /tmp/sb_index.html
grep -oE 'src="[^"]+\.js"' /tmp/sb_index.html | sed 's/src="//;s/"//' > /tmp/sb_js.txt
# Fetch each bundle (use the http/web_fetch tool or curl) into /tmp/sb_bundles/ ...
Grep the HTML and every JS bundle for:
# Project URL — gives you <ref>.supabase.co
grep -roE 'https://[a-z0-9]{20}\.supabase\.co' /tmp/sb_bundles/ | sort -u
grep -roiE 'supabase[._-]?url["'\'' :=]+[^"'\'' ,)]+' /tmp/sb_bundles/
# Anon / service_role key — a JWT (eyJ...). Supabase keys decode to {"role":"anon"|"service_role"}
grep -roE 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+' /tmp/sb_bundles/ | sort -u
grep -roiE 'supabase[._-]?(anon[._-]?)?key["'\'' :=]+[^"'\'' ,)]+' /tmp/sb_bundles/
grep -roiE 'createClient\([^)]*\)' /tmp/sb_bundles/
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 252 lines · 120 tokens per session scan A 0973d3b1b3cc
supabase is a skill published in the GitHub repository PentesterFlow/agent (1,400 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 120 tokens to every session and 3,325 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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