Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add skills/pentesterflow/agent/supabasenpx skills add PentesterFlow/agent --skill supabasegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PentesterFlow/agentWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00120 | $0.03325 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00060 | $0.01663 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00665 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00332 |
Grade A, and why
supabase scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -ksS "https://TARGET/" -o /tmp/sb_index.html How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 252 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supabase RLS playbook
Supabase exposes PostgreSQL directly to the browser through PostgREST (/rest/v1/),
GoTrue auth (/auth/v1/), and Storage (/storage/v1/). The browser authenticates
with a public anon JWT, and the only thing standing between an anonymous attacker and
the database is Row-Level Security (RLS) policies. Misconfigured or missing RLS is the
entire bug class:
- RLS disclosure —
SELECTon a table returns rows it shouldn't (PII, tokens, other tenants). - RLS write abuse —
INSERT/UPDATE/DELETEsucceeds anonymously, so you can forge records the application trusts (a "certificate" / verification / license / entitlement row, an admin flag, a balance, someone else's data).
Authorized targets only. Treat the database as production: read a single marker row to prove disclosure, write ONE clearly-labelled marker row to prove write, then clean up. Never dump whole tables of real PII, never mass-modify, never
DELETEreal rows. The PoC is "I read/wrote one row I shouldn't be able to", not "I exfiltrated the customer base".
Execution rule: substitute the real Supabase project ref, anon key, table, and marker IDs before running commands. Never write literal placeholders such as <ref>, <table>, <col>, or <returned-id> to files; if a value is unknown, discover it first or ask once.
0. Find the project URL + anon key in the frontend JS
The project ref and anon key are meant to be public — they ship in the client bundle. You need both before you can talk to the API.
# Pull the main page + every script it references, then grep for the markers.
curl -ksS "https://TARGET/" -o /tmp/sb_index.html
grep -oE 'src="[^"]+\.js"' /tmp/sb_index.html | sed 's/src="//;s/"//' > /tmp/sb_js.txt
# Fetch each bundle (use the http/web_fetch tool or curl) into /tmp/sb_bundles/ ...
Grep the HTML and every JS bundle for:
# Project URL — gives you <ref>.supabase.co
grep -roE 'https://[a-z0-9]{20}\.supabase\.co' /tmp/sb_bundles/ | sort -u
grep -roiE 'supabase[._-]?url["'\'' :=]+[^"'\'' ,)]+' /tmp/sb_bundles/
# Anon / service_role key — a JWT (eyJ...). Supabase keys decode to {"role":"anon"|"service_role"}
grep -roE 'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]+\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]+' /tmp/sb_bundles/ | sort -u
grep -roiE 'supabase[._-]?(anon[._-]?)?key["'\'' :=]+[^"'\'' ,)]+' /tmp/sb_bundles/
grep -roiE 'createClient\([^)]*\)' /tmp/sb_bundles/
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 252 lines · 120 tokens per session scan A 0973d3b1b3cc
supabase is a skill published in the GitHub repository PentesterFlow/agent (1,316 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 120 tokens to every session and 3,325 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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